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						6207	Moore	Hall,	Dartmouth	College,	Hanover,	NH	03755,	United	States		 	A B S TRACT 			The	machinery	of	the	human	brain	–	analog,	probabilistic,	embodied	–	can	be	characterized	computationally,	 but	 what	 machinery	 confers	 what	 computational	 powers?	 	 Any	 such	system	 can	be	 abstractly	 cast	 in	 terms	of	 two	 computational	 components:	 a	 finite	 state	machine	carrying	out	computational	steps,	whether	via	currents,	chemistry,	or	mechanics;	plus	a	set	of	allowable	memory	operations,	typically	formulated	in	terms	of	an	information	store	that	can	be	read	from	and	written	to,	whether	via	synaptic	change,	state	transition,	or	recurrent	activity.		Probing	these	mechanisms	for	their	information	content,	we	can	capture	the	difference	in	computational	power	that	various	systems	are	capable	of.	 	Most	human	cognitive	abilities,	from	perception	to	action	to	memory,	are	shared	with	other	species;	we	seek	to	characterize	those	(few)	capabilities	that	are	ubiquitously	present	among	humans	and	absent	from	other	species.		Three	realms	of	formidable	constraints	---	a)	measurable	human	cognitive	abilities,	b)	measurable	allometric	anatomic	brain	characteristics,	and	c)	measurable	 features	of	specific	automata	and	formal	grammars	---	 illustrate	remarkably	sharp	restrictions	on	human	abilities,	unexpectedly	confining	human	cognition	to	a	specific	class	of	automata	(“nested	stack”),	which	are	markedly	below	Turing	machines.				
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I.			Introduction:	toward	quantification	of	cognition	What	kind	of	machinery	underlies	human	thought?		The	terminology	alone	(‘machinery’,	‘thought’)	can	be	misleading:	decades	of	inquiry	into	the	nature	of	humans’	(and	other	animals’)	mental	abilities	have	yielded	few	if	any	specifications	that	characterize	such	abilities,	nor	many	exacting	measures,	nor	even	formal	lists	of	these	abilities.						By	contrast,	if	we	wished	to	characterize,	say,	the	thrust	of	a	rocket	engine,	or	the	tensile	strength	of	mild	steel,	these	are	readily	specified.		But	to	characterize	the	performance	of,	say,	an	artificial	language	system	such	as	Siri,	there	is	no	clear	set	of	measurements.		Siri’s	syntax	can	readily	be	checked	by	straightforward	principles,	but	her	meanings	cannot	be	checked	by	any	currently-known	principles.					This	strange	fact	is	crucial	to	emphasize:	the	only	“correctness”	measures	of	the	advanced	utterances	of	a	system	such	as	Siri	(or	Alexa,	or	the	sundry	others)	are	in	terms	of	empirical	testing	across	broad	ranges	of	examples.		Not	in	terms	of	known	principles	or	specifications.					Siri	makes	jarring	errors	that	even	a	young	child	would	not	make,	and	it	is	still	unclear	how	to	formalize	them.		If	I	ask	Siri	“where	is	the	nearest	gas	station?”	and	she	replies	“Dialing	Stillnorth	bookstore,”	in	what	sense	is	that	response	deemed	an	error?		By	Siri’s	internal	logic,	the	response	was	somehow	the	correct	output	computed	from	the	input	she	received.		The	sole	reason	that	we	describe	it	as	an	error	–	in	fact,	the	sole	reason	that	we	know	that	Siri	makes	errors	at	all	–	is	that	it	doesn’t	make	sense	to	us;	i.e.,	we	humans	do	not	understand	how	Siri’s	answer	is	connected	with	our	query.		This	is	still	just	empiricism:	we	intuit	that	a	human	wouldn’t	make	that	response,	and	if	they	did,	we	could	probe	what	misunderstanding	or	mis-hearing	led	to	it.		That	is	starkly	different	from	rockets	or	steel:	for	those	measures,	there	are	principles	and	mathematics	that	structurally	organize	any	queries	about	engine	or	material	performance.		Those	metrics	are	separate	from	any	human	empirical	judgment	call.		We	may	protest	that	those	are	artificial	systems,	whereas	Siri	(although	also	artificial)	is	aimed	at	mimicking	natural	systems.		Exactly.		The	lack	of	formal	principles	or	specifications	for	natural	systems	is	what	is	at	issue.		There	is	no	a	priori	spec	sheet	for	what	human	language	performance	(for	instance)	is	“supposed”	to	be.		There	are	right	answers,	and	we	cannot	yet	say	what	they	are.						At	present	this	is	a	rigid	limit	to	constructing	systems	that	are	intended	to	be	at	all	“cognitive.”	For	any	typical	“cognitive”	system	such	as	Siri,	the	benchmark	achievements	are	attained	largely	in	the	absence	of	deeper	understanding,	unlike	the	case	for	systems	such	as	engines	and	materials.						Marr	(Marr	1982)	presciently	warned	of	the	need	to	carefully	particularize	the	“computation”	or	“specification”	level	of	a	task,	that	is,	the	characterization	of	its	overall	abilities,	independent	of	the	candidate	mechanisms	(implementation	and	algorithms)	that	may	produce	those	abilities.		A	proposed	system	built	for	a	given	task	cannot	succeed	if	that	task	is	ill-defined.				A	software	system	could	be	constructed	with	the	intention	to	carry	out,	say,	handwriting	recognition;	and	extensive	effort,	testing,	and	validation	steps	could	be	undertaken,	only	to	eventually	discover	that	the	task	itself	had	been	ill-defined,	and	thus	seemingly-accurate	recognition	systems	may	abruptly	encounter	instances	on	which	they	radically	fail,	such	as	“Captchas.”				Until	the	appearance	of	captchas,	handwriting	recognition	software	seemed	swimmingly	successful,	but	this	was	an	illusion:	the	software	succeeded	on	extant	datasets,	but	the	field	did	not	actually	
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have	an	adequate	characterization	of	handwriting.		Humans	recognize	simple	captchas	effortlessly,	apparently	using	the	same	perceptual	processing	that	they	employ	in	recognizing	other,	less	noisy,	handwriting.		But	the	candidate	systems	that	were	being	forwarded	for	handwriting	recognition	fell	apart	entirely	when	presented	with	Captchas.				It	is	worth	emphasizing	that,	until	the	appearance	of	these	problematic	captchas,	the	field	solidly	believed	that	it	was	succeeding	(LeCun	et	al.	1998).		There	was	no	widespread	acknowledgement	that	the	field	was	studying	a	task	that	would	very	soon	utterly	fail	to	match	human	performance	on	these	simple	extensions	to	handwriting	–	extensions	that	humans	themselves	had	no	trouble	with.		Captchas	caught	the	field	unawares.			From	its	apparent	and	illusory	successes,	the	field	abruptly	fell	flat.		The	field	took	roughly	another	
ten	years	to	finally	achieve	reliable	Captcha	recognition	(George	et	al.	2017).				We	are	in	a	similar	epoch	today.		A	predominant	focus	on	the	statistics	of	huge	data	(such	as	games,	image	classification,	shopping	recommendations)	artfully	alters	the	metric	for	success.		Rather	than	addressing	open-ended	problems	as	humans	typically	do,	they	aim	at	achieving	a	known	metric	(e.g.,	a	game	win).		These	games	are	being	won	by	massive	memorization	and	processing	of	millions	of	instances;	see,	e.g.,	the	meticulous	recent	review	by	Serre	(Serre	2019).		This	is	highly	reminiscent	of	the	decades-old	standard	computer	science	field	of	numerical	computation,	which	may	have	no	important	relation	to	intelligence	or	cognition,	let	alone	human	intelligence	or	cognition	–	but	is	highly	successful	at	‘big	data’.				AlphaGo	has	played	millions	of	games:	i.e.,	the	equivalent	of	the	combined	life	experience	of	an	imagined	hundreds	of	thousands	of	Go	players.		Humans	perform	highly	complex	tasks	of	recognition,	retrieval,	decision	(not	to	mention	creativity	and	invention)	in	the	absence	of	million-sized	datasets.				This	many-orders-of-magnitude	difference	in	amassed	experience	is	sufficiently	vast	that	it	can	reasonably	be	characterized	as	a	difference	in	kind.		A	human	playing	Go	is	not	performing	the	task	that	AlphaGo	is	performing.					But,	but,	they	both	make	the	same	moves!		They	both	can	be	measured	by	their	wins	and	losses!		Surely	they	are	indeed	doing	the	same	task!		What	is	that	task?		If	it	is	measured	purely	behaviorally,	as	pieces	moving	on	a	board,	the	tasks	are	the	same.		If	there	is	even	the	remotest	interest	in	the	mental	behaviors	of	a	player,	then	the	specifications	may	be	wildly,	incommensurately	distinct.					Lacking	these	specifications	of	actual	human	mental	behavior,	it	can	be	all	too	easy	for	us	to	imagine	that	we	are	formally	addressing	a	task.		Just	as	the	field	of	handwriting	recognition	indeed	imagined,	for	many	years	before	captchas.		Task	specification	is	the	crucial	starting	ingredient	that	matters;	otherwise	we	get	million-data-memorizers	such	as	the	AlphaGo/AlphaZero/AlphaStar	family.					The	lesson	is	not	being	learned.		Tasks	are	carefully	steered	away	from	far-reaching	human	abilities,	focusing	instead	on	data	memorization	mixed	with	slight	generalization,	as	in	game	playing.		By	this	nostrum,	a	stream	of	attractive	and	lucrative	successes	are	toted	up,	largely	disregarding	the	failures	and	shortfalls	(Serre	2019).						
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In	fact,	the	same	approach	that	gave	the	appearance	of	succeeding	so	impressively	at	initial	handwriting	recognition,	and	then	failed	so	spectacularly	when	faced	with	Captchas,	is	still	one	of	the	dominant	approaches	in	the	field.					To	be	sure,	these	sedulous	approaches	deserve	acclaim	for	their	grueling	analyses	of	colossal	data	sets	---	but	we	may	ask	what	are	the	next	Captchas	that	will	starkly	illuminate	the	shortcomings	of	current	approaches?			Most	common-sense	knowledge;	most	language	semantics;	most	of	our	everyday	understanding	of	the	real	world.		Today’s	“intelligent”	systems	can	“read”	books,	and	then	prove	unable	to	answer	some	of	the	most	basic	questions	about	what	happened	in	the	books.		Marcus	and	Davis	(Marcus	and	Davis	2019)	provide	illustrative	examples:	after	the	“Google	Talk	to	Books”	system	read	the	Harry	Potter	books,	when	asked	“How	did	Harry	Potter	meet	Hermione	Granger?”,	no	answers	came	close	to	answering	the	question,	and	most	were	wildly	off-point.						(Many	in	the	field	are	very	mindful	of	the	situation,	aware	that	most	current	approaches	provide	measures	of	just	the	narrow	efficacy	of	specific	programs	on	given	families	of	datasets.		Researchers	are	actively	striving	for	applicable	metrics	that	could	assess	systems	more	broadly,	potentially	identifying	“IQ-like”	scalar	measures,	especially	for	proposed	artificial	general	intelligence	(AGI)	systems.		There	are	a	range	of	views	on	this	approach;	see,	e.g.,	(Legg	and	Hutter	2007;	Hernandez-Orallo,	Dowe,	and	Hernandez-Lloreda	2014;	Dowe	and	Hernandez-Orallo	2012;	Chollet	2019).		These	approaches	are	seeking	“feasible	and	reasonable”	tests	to	which	a	system	could	be	subjected,	probing	“universal”	abilities	rather	than	“customized”	for	particular	tasks	(Hernandez-Orallo,	Dowe,	and	Hernandez-Lloreda	2014).		A	separate	question	is	this:	what	kind	of	machine	generates	the	abilities	that	they	are	measuring?		Studies	of	that	kind	appear	to	target	any	constructed	subset	of	universal	Turing	machines	(artificial	or	natural),	without	distinguishing	among	the	differential	abilities	that	arise	at	different	sites	within	the	automata	hierarchy.)							This	problem	is	not	about	language	or	reading	per	se.		It	is	about	the	representation	and	manipulation	of	knowledge.		The	sentences	in	the	books	are	largely	parsed	correctly,	and	semantics	of	individual	statements	are	coded.		However,	human	readers	educe	huge	additional	amounts	of	information	from	such	sentences.		“John	saw	Jenny’s	name	in	the	paper”	implies	that	John	had	a	newspaper	(whether	ink	or	screen),	and	held	it,	and	read	it,	and	that	there	was	a	story	in	it	that	discussed	a	person	named	Jenny,	and	that	John	evidently	knew	something	about	this	Jenny	independent	of	the	newspaper	story.		Even	seemingly	simple	sentences	have	this	property:	they	signal	large	amounts	of	real-world	episodic	knowledge	that	is	represented	in	the	reader’s	head		(e.g.,	(Frankland	and	Greene	2014)	for	relevant	studies).				The	organization	and	manipulation	of	knowledge	is	a	crucial	part	of	cognition.		It	underpins	language	understanding,	and	much	more:	seeing	sequences	of	interactions	in	a	movie	or	play,	without	dialogue,	can	readily	convey	correspondingly	large	amounts	of	knowledge	in	an	observer.				Learning	and	memory	–	the	acquisition	and	storage	of	that	knowledge	–	is	the	central	difference	between	biological	intelligences	and	the	current	set	of	artificial	supposed	approaches	to	intelligence.				When	the	term	“representation”	is	used	in	the	artificial	neural	network	literature,	it	typically	is	expropriated	to	denote	graded	levels	of	feature	combination	in	successive	backpropagation	layers.		This	of	course	specifically	lacks	a	crucial	element	in	wider	usage	of	“representation”	throughout	the	cognitive	literature:	that	of	relations.		Mental	representations	include	relations	among	entities	(above,	before,	within);	among	episodic	content	(such	as	explicit	temporal	sequence	information);	and	more.		Distinctions	are	crucial	if	we	wish	to	carefully	characterize	the	differences	among	
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cognitive	systems.		So-called	“representations”	that	merely	conflate	features	into	simple	composite	entities	within	“isa”	hierarchies	are	a	highly	restricted	subset	of	more	general	relational	representations.						To	address	this	distinction,	many	researchers	attempt	to	construct	“hybrid”	systems	that	use	artificial	neural	networks	to	analyze	perceptual	information	on	one	hand,	and	symbolic	or	rule-based	systems	for	higher	conceptual	or	relational	information,	on	the	other.		But	in	a	brain,	if	there	are	both	“low-level”	neural	operations	and	“high-level”	symbols,	presumably	the	latter	arise	directly	from	the	former,	and	the	two	interact	seamlessly.		“Hybrid”	systems	avoid	addressing	this	fundamental	seamlessness	of	information	in	brains.		Previous	studies	have	shown	how	the	physiological	operation	of	thalamocortical	anatomic	circuitry	can	be	directly	interpreted	in	terms	of	grammars,	which	in	turn	can	embody	rules;	these	studies	and	related	work	may	aid	in	identifying	the	underlying	links	between	low-	and	high-level	processing	in	human	brains	(Rodriguez,	Whitson,	and	Granger	2004;	Granger	2006;	Rodriguez	and	Granger	2016).			Until	we	can	characterize	the	nature	of	our	stored	information,	and	the	nature	of	the	brain	circuit	machinery	that	stores,	retrieves,	and	manipulates	it,	we	have	not	understood	the	fundamentals	of	human	cognition.		Possibly,	as	current	machine	learning	would	have	it,	all	our	stored	knowledge	is	nothing	more	than	stockpiled	statistics	educed	from	big	data.		The	simple	examples	of	John	and	Jenny,	and	Harry	and	Hermione,	and	many,	many	more,	argue	otherwise.		It	appears	that	current	artificial	systems	are	not	adequately	characterizing	crucial	features	of	human	cognition.				With	these	admonitions	in	mind,	we	pursue	specifications	(Marr’s	“computation”	level)	for	human	cognitive	capacities.		The	pursuit	entails	multiple	threads	across	disciplinary	boundaries	that	may	initially	appear	unrelated.		Of	particular	note	are	i)	the	anatomical	regularities	of	brain	allometry,	ii)	the	close	apparent	relations	among	multiple	uniquely-human	cognitive	abilities;	and	iii)	the	equivalence	classes	of	formal	automata.		We	show	how	these	may	be	related	to	each	other	to	engender	a	formulation	of	the	computational	capacity	of	human	brains.		That	is,	what	kind	of	machine	is	a	human	brain?					
II.		Summary:	behavior,	allometry,	automata	a)	Qualitative	and	quantitative	characterizations	of	empirical	human	cognitive	behaviors	Humans	are	plainly	different	from	other	primates:	we	drive	cars,	read	books,	build	houses.		Yet	clear	specifications	of	the	abilities	that	characterize	us	have	proven	maddeningly	elusive.		Other	animals	make	war,	transmit	culture,	use	tools,	exhibit	some	number	sense,	infer	other	animals’	intentions,	and	much	more;	ongoing	work	attempts	to	distinguish	uniquely	human	forms	of	such	abilities	from	nonhuman	(possibly	antecedent)	versions;	e.g.,	(Herrmann	et	al.	2007;	Suddendorf	2013).						Abilities	such	as	counting,	logic,	perspective-taking,	all	may	share	some	characteristics	across	species,	as	examples	of	“triune”	capacities:	those	for	which	there	appear	to	be	three	separable	variants.		Number	sense,	for	instance,	has	a	variant	typically	referred	to	as	“numerosity”	(Brannon	and	Terrace	1998),	an	ability	to	distinguish	some	quantities	(e.g.,	two	vs	five)	without	being	able	to	count	arbitrary	quantities	(Gelman	and	Gallistel	1978).		In	addition	to	the	nonhuman	(numerosity)	and	human	(counting)	variants,	there	also	are	much	more	advanced	variants	(arithmetic,	calculus,	etc.)	possessed	by	many	humans	but	very	far	from	universal.				These	three	variants:	rudimentary,	uniquely	human,	and	advanced,	may	be	broad	categories	applicable	to	multiple	human	capabilities.		The	“rudimentary”	versions	of	abilities	(such	as	
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numerosity)	may	occur	in	nonhumans	or	in	humans	during	early	development.		In	most	cases,	the	precise	relationship	between	nonhuman	capabilities,	on	one	hand,	and	the	capabilities	of	humans	during	early	development,	on	the	other	hand,	remains	unknown;	the	abilities	are	not	yet	sufficiently	quantified	to	enable	detailed	comparisons.		Similarly,	the	highly	advanced	versions	of	uniquely	human	abilities	are	divergent	and	variable	(arithmetic,	logic,	calculus,	linear	algebra,	...);	it	remains	unknown	(and	controversial)	whether	the	formal	computational	capacities	underlying	all	such	abilities	(some	core	“math	ability”)	are	related	or	distinct.				Without	resolving	these	further	subdivisions,	we	adopt	a	triune	terminology	for	cognitive	capacities,	distinguishing	between	those	that	either	are	simpler	than,	or	equal	to,	or	surpass,	unique	human	abilities.		The	triune	distinction	intrinsically	generates	a	class	of	abilities	that	are	neither	rudimentary	nor	expert:	that	is,	they	are	unique	to	humans	and	not	other	species,	and	are	exhibited	by	all	humans	(below	the	abilities	of	highly	trained	experts).		The	resulting	central	class	is	that	of	“all	and	only”	abilities:	those	possessed	by	every	human	(barring	neuropathology)	and	all	humans	(not	just	trained	experts).				
						  
Figure 1 					We	posit	that	these	“all	and	only”	human	abilities	are	highly	worthy	of	study	in	their	own	right,	as	well	as	in	contrast	to	their	possible	rudimentary	and	expert	forms.		In	particular,	if	a	given	ability	is	possessed	by	approximately	every	human	but	evidence	indicates	that	it	is	not	possessed	by	nonhumans,	then	something	in	us	endows	us	with	this	ability.		Throughout,	we	strive	to	focus	on	distinctions	among	the	three	clearly	distinguishable	categories	of	abilities	–	non-	or	early-human;	all-and-only	human;	and	expert-human	–	as	they	arise.					
b)	Brains:		Allometric	comparative	anatomy		Although	evolution	is	alleged	to	produce	“endless	forms	most	beautiful”	in	Darwin’s	poetic	phrase,	actual	biological	product	is	severely	constrained.		All	mammals	have	nearly	identical	limbs,	toes,	organs;	famously,	giraffes	have	the	same	number	of	neck	vertebrae	as	mice	and	mammoths.				Brains	are	no	exception:	all	are	astoundingly	similar	across	four	orders	of	magnitude	in	size	in	mammals.		The	size	and	connectivity	of	almost	every	brain	component	and	connection	pathway	can	be	computed	with	disturbing	accuracy,	from	just	the	overall	size	of	a	brain	(Finlay	and	Darlington	1995;	Striedter	2005;	Herculano-Houzel	et	al.	2007;	Lynch	and	Granger	2008)	via	a	simple	set	of	allometric	equations.		In	other	words,	all	mammalian	brains	obey	the	same	severely	constrained	set	of	rigorously	predictable	designs.					(Note	the	essential	distinction	between	relative	size	and	allometrically-predicted	size.		Relative	sizes	of	brain	parts	change	drastically,	as	in	the	case	of	area	10,	yet	they	do	so	entirely	predictably,	as	a	
ancestral
al l-and-only human abil it ies
developmental
core
expert Figure 1.  Some abilities (“expert”) are only 
acquired via training plus external 
apparatus (e.g., paper and pencil); some 
(“ancestral”) are present in us and also in 
other animals; some (“developmental”) 
occur in primitive early form before 
maturing.  Some are present in all humans 
and no other animals (“all-and-only”); 
these abilities presumably have some 
combination of “core” (developmental 
and/or ancestral) precursors.   
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function	of	straightforward	allometric	equations	associated	with	each	area	–	equations	that	account	for	more	than	99%	of	the	size	variance	of	all	brain	areas,	across	all	the	hominids,	including	humans	(Finlay	and	Darlington	1995;	Semendeferi	et	al.	2002)	(see	Figure	2).)			In	sum,	the	parts	of	a	primate	brain,	and	the	way	those	parts	are	wired	together,	are	rigidly	determined	by	allometric	relations.			
 
Figure 2			The	rigidity	of	allometry	should	shock	us.		Where	is	selection?		Where,	for	that	matter,	are	all	of	Darwin’s	“endless	forms”?		Divergences	from	allometry	do	exist	–	so-called	“mosaic”	species	differences	that	can	indeed	be	selected	for.		They	are	surprisingly	rare,	and,	when	they	occur,	surprisingly	minute	(e.g.,	the	small	divergences	from	regression	lines	in	the	figure).				Notable	exceptions	occur	in	nonhuman	animals,	yet	the	search	for	specialized	brain	‘organs’	in	humans	–	ala	a	cow’s	stomach,	or	bat’s	radar	–	thus	far	come	up	surprisingly	short.		Human	brains	are	exquisitely	consistent	with	sheer	allometry,	giving	as	yet	no	new	hint	of	how	a	given	observed	difference	could	mechanistically	enable	gifts	such	as	human	language	to	spring	forth	in	us	and	in	no	others;	see,	e.g.,	(Yang	et	al.	2017;	Tattersall	2017;	Hauser	et	al.	2014;	Berwick	and	Chomsky	2016;	Fedorenko	2014;	Friederici	et	al.	2006).					If	allometric	relations	so	rigidly	obtain,	then	many	of	Darwin’s	“possible”	forms	are	evidently	not	being	generated.		It	is	not	that	they	are	first	generated	and	then	selected	against.		There	are	no	living	beings	nor	fossil	records	of	substantial	divergences	from	allometry.		Something	in	our	genome	prevents	them	from	being	generated,	or	from	successfully	making	it	through	development,	in	the	first	place.		This	is	starkly	different	from	selection,	in	the	sense	of	organisms	being	born	with	differences,	and	competing	in	environments,	and	possibly	dying	off.		Allometry	does	not	indicate	any	of	those	steps:	rather,	genomes	operate	in	such	a	way	that	they	adhere	to	allometric	constraints	throughout	development	and	adulthood,	as	opposed	to	trying	out	different	forms	and	letting	them	“compete”.		These	facts	about	allometry	are	widely	discussed	in	the	evolutionary	literature;	see,	e.g.,	(Wagner	2014).		Many,	many	instances	of	“evolved”	traits	(such	as	human	area	10	size)	exhibit	no	evident	characteristics	of	selection,	variation,	or	evolutionary	pressure.		They	are	allometrically	predetermined	(Striedter	2005;	Semendeferi	et	al.	2002).		The	change	in	overall	brain	size	may	be	considered	an	evolved	trait;	but	any	additional	novel	brain	attributes	(such	as	sizes	of	particular	
 
Figure 2.  Distinct allometric slopes per 
brain region.  Slope determines the 
volume percentage allocated to that 
brain area, as overall brain size (x axis) 
varies.  If the slope is >1, the area 
becomes a disproportionately larger 
percentage of the brain, as brain size 
increases. Phylogenetically earlier 
structures have lower slopes; relatively 
later structures (including 
neocerebellum) have higher slopes.  See 
also Figure 6.   
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areas)	arrive	as	preëstablished	parts	of	the	package	of	allometrically	concerted	changes;	i.e.,	traits	that	are	forcibly,	allometrically,	yoked	to	the	change	in	the	overall	brain	size.					Human	brains	are	unexpectedly	large	compared	to	our	body	sizes	–	but	human	brains	are	no	exception	whatsoever	to	the	allometric	relations	of	all	other	primates	(and	mammal)	brains.		Our	brains	rigidly	adhere	to	the	same	equations.		The	divergences	between	human	and	other	primate	brains	are	breathtakingly	tiny.		To	extraordinary	accuracy,	human	brains	are	precisely	scaled-up	chimp	brains	(Herculano-Houzel	2009,	2012).		These	stringent	constraints	are	among	the	most	powerful	fundamental	biological	phenomena	underlying	any	candidate	hypotheses	of	human	brains.			This,	of	course,	begs	the	question	of	how	we,	alone	among	the	primates,	live	in	houses,	drive	cars,	administer	vaccines.		We	are	at	least	as	social	as	other	highly-social	primates;	we	uniquely	cook	food;	we	uniquely	read	other	people’s	intentions;	we	uniquely	use	arithmetic.		Why	only	humans?		What	kind	of	machine	is	a	human	brain,	that	it	confers	these	unique	talents?							
c)	Computation:		Specification	of	automata	and	grammars		Pioneers	of	computability	theory	(Turing,	Church,	Hilbert,	Kleene,	Gödel,	Rosser,	Post,	and	others)	introduced	formal	properties	of	computation,	their	limits	(such	as	undecidable	problems),	and	their	equivalences.		The	Church-Turing	thesis,	for	instance,	identified	the	equivalence	of	Turing’s	abstract	computing	device	(an	automaton	termed	an	“a-machine”),	𝜆-calculus	(a	formal	logic	system),	and	recursively	enumerable	functions	(a	specification	of	a	language,	i.e.,	a	formal	grammar)	(Church	1936;	Doyle	2002).							Each	machine	(automaton)	can	be	seen	as	a	finite	representation	of	a	(potentially	infinite)	formal	language	(set	of	acceptable	sequential	“strings”),	and	automata	are	typically	classified	according	to	the	specific	set	of	languages	they	can	“recognize,”	i.e.,	the	grammars	that	their	computations	can	produce	or	parse.					Chomsky,	Post,	Aho,	Hopcroft,	Ullman,	and	others	(Chomsky	1975;	Hopcroft	and	Ullman	1969)	provided	a	containment	hierarchy,	classifying	automata	and	their	associated	grammars	by	these	computational	powers,	from	least	(finite	state	machines,	computing	regular	grammars)	to	most	powerful	(Turing	machines,	computing	recursively	enumerable	grammars).				
 
Figure 3			Notably,	the	automata/grammar	hierarchy	establishes	equivalence	classes.		That	is,	seemingly	different	machines	can	be	found	to	be	equivalent	in	terms	of	what	they	can	accomplish,	i.e.,	what	they	can	compute,	as	in	the	discussion	of	Marr	in	the	Introduction.		(See	also	Figure	12).			We	can	build	a	mechanical	adding	machine	out	of	gears,	levers	and	other	parts	---	and	we	can	build	an	
recursively	enumerable
context	sensi2ve	
mildly	context	sensi2ve
context	free
regular
subregular
0
1
2
3
Figure 3.  A version of the grammar hierarchy (see Fig 
12 for comparison).  The simplest finite state automata 
have no stack memories, generating subregular and 
regular languages.  Addition of unrestricted single 
stack memory yields context-free and mildly-context-
sensitive languages.  Expansion to multiple, 
independently addressable stacks of restricted length 
generates context sensitive languages.  Removing the 
stack length constraint produces recursively 
enumerable languages.  (The original hierarchy had 
Type 0,1,2,3 grammars, shown.)  
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electronic	adding	machine	out	of	transistors,	diodes,	and	other	components.		The	two	may	have	identical	output	behaviors:	present	two	numbers	and	their	sum	will	be	produced	(possibly	with	the	same	latencies).		If	so,	the	two	machines	are	equivalent	in	terms	of	their	“computation”	level,	but	they	differ	in	the	steps	that	they	carry	out	(algorithms)	to	arrive	at	those	ultimate	computational	outputs,	and	they	differ	further	in	the	materials	used	to	embody	those	algorithmic	steps	(i.e.,	their	“implementations”).				The	distinction	among	these	levels	(computation,	algorithm,	implementation)	establishes	“equivalence	classes”	at	the	computation	level,	i.e.,	a	range	of	different	machines	that	nonetheless	exhibit	directly	comparable	task-level	behaviors.					If	these	equivalence	classes	can	be	identified	for	particular	tasks,	that	will	not	mean	that	the	brain	mechanisms	for	those	tasks	will	have	been	discovered.		It	may	be	that	brains	use	different	implementation	methods,	or	even	different	algorithms,	to	carry	out	the	equivalent	computations.		Nonetheless,	equivalence	classes	may	be	illuminating.		At	present,	existing	systems	such	as	Alpha	Go	are	not	being	directly	compared	to	careful	characterizations	of	human	Go-playing	behaviors.		As	long	as	the	aim	is	simply	to	numerically	win	the	game,	little	is	being	learned	about	human	intelligence	at	all.		As	improved	characterizations	of	human	behavior	and	cognition	are	developed,	our	understanding	is	correspondingly	incremented.				Turing’s	initial	aim	was	to	identify	the	formal	quantitative	power	of	a	“computer,”	which	at	that	time	was	a	clearly	defined	term	referring	to	a	human	(or	room	full	of	humans)	with	paper	and	pencil,	following	instructions.		For	large	projects	(such	as	war	efforts),	groups	of	trained	people	(“computers”)	were	recruited	to	sit	at	tables	and	carefully	obey	instructions	to	carry	out	written	manipulations	per	instructions	from	group	leaders.		(The	eventual	term	“electronic	computers”	was,	of	course,	by	contrasting	reference	to	the	original	(human)	computers.)				Armed	with	arbitrary	access	to	pads	of	paper	(and	calculating	machines)	from	which	they	could	read	out	information	and	to	which	they	could	record	information,	those	carefully-instructed	humans	could	achieve	large-scale	mathematical	calculations	---	operations	beyond	what	individuals	were	able	to	attain	on	their	own,	with	no	external	appurtenances.						That	pattern	is	captured	and	formalized	in	one	of	the	standard	definitions	of	a	Turing	machine,	which	consists	of	a	module	to	carry	out	instructions	(a	“finite	state	machine”,	or	FSM),	and	a	defined	way	to	write	to,	and	read	from,	a	specified	set	of	memory	storage	locations	(a	“stack”,	or	a	“tape”).		The	formal	automata	hierarchy	defines	multiple	distinct	levels	of	computational	power,	each	denoted	by	its	FSM	plus	some	specific	connate	memory	system,	denoted	by	specific	formal	terms,	from	so-called	“restricted”	(R)	stack	memories,	through	“unrestricted”	(UR),	“nested”	(N),	“bounded”	(B),	and	“unbounded	(UB)	stack	systems.		(The	terms	can	be	misleadingly	counterintuitive	compared	to	their	non-mathematical	dictionary	definitions;	for	instance,	“unrestricted	single	stacks”	are	far	weaker	than	“bounded	multiple	stacks.”				Cognition	is	not	directly	carried	out	by	machines	in	the	automata	hierarchy;	there	is	no	intention	to	conflate	the	two.		Rather,	the	different	levels	of	complexity	of	various	mammalian	brains,	from	mouse	to	mammoth,	may	be	evaluated	for	their	measurable	cognitive	abilities.		There	has	been	evidence	offered	of	automata-cognitive	relations,	in	rodents,	in	primates,	in	humans,	and	even	in	avian	species	(see,	e.g.,	(Fitch	and	Friederici	2012;	Hagoort	2019;	Fitch	2014;	Petkov	and	Jarvis	2012)).			
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d)	Summary	Our	focus	is	the	quantification	of	cognition:	the	ability	to	measure	magnitudes	of	human	mental	capacities	and	to	test	their	correspondence	to	known	metrics	of	artificial	automata.		(Such	an	approach	stands	in	contrast	to	uncalibrated	methods	such	as	i.q.	tests,	or	other	simple	compilations	of	scores	on	tasks.)		At	the	time	of	Church,	Turing,	Post,	and	others,	no	such	metric	data	existed.		Even	during	the	later	era	of	Chomsky,	Hopcroft,	Ullman,	Aho,	and	colleagues,	there	still	were	no	such	measures	expressing	formally	quantified	evaluations	of	any	complex	human	capacities.		Beginning	in	the	1980s,	and	continuing	to	this	day,	there	are	numerous	quantitative	assessments,	predominantly	in	the	realm	of	specific	human	language	capacities.		Remarkably,	their	findings	all	are	in	close	agreement	with	each	other	(Vijay-Shanker	and	Weir	1994;	Joshi,	Vijay-Shanker,	and	Weir	1991;	Weir	1992).					Extant	quantitative	evaluations	of	human	cognitive	limits,	together	with	the	well-studied	allometric	constraints	on	brain	structure,	severely	constrict	the	set	of	formal	automata	that	conform	with	the	data.		The	resulting	findings	were	unexpected,	yet	they	are	solidly	grounded;	they	bespeak	a	seemingly	inescapable	assessment	of	the	computational	power	that	is	intrinsic	to	human	minds.					
III.		All	humans;	only	humans.			As	introduced	above,	we	address	empirical	specifications	of	human	brains	and	cognition,	applying	the	findings	to	the	automata	and	grammar	hierarchy.		In	the	following	subsections,	we	introduce	a	small	fixed	set	of	critical	constraints,	in	the	three	domains	of:			- cognition:	empirically	observed	species-specific	mental	capabilities,	- circuitry:	comparative	neuroanatomy	across	species,	and		- computation:	situating	behaviors	and	biologies	among	automata	and	grammars.			Together,	the	intersection	of	these	aspects	of	neuroscience,	automata	theory,	linguistics,	comparative	anatomy,	comparative	ethology,	and	brain	evolution,	are	shown	to	establish	a	staggeringly	restrictive	set	of	constraints	about	the	intrinsic	capacity	of	human	brains.		We	formulate	and	discuss	what	they	entail	for	admissible	candidate	propositions	about	human	cognitive	capabilities.			
	
A.	Qualitative	and	quantitative	characterizations	of	empirical	human	cognitive	capacities	
Thesis	A.1)	Humans	are	qualitatively	different	from	other	primates		There	used	to	be	a	“human	uniqueness”	list:		human	abilities	that	definitively	distinguished	us	from	other	organisms.		On	the	list,	at	various	times,	were	reasoning,	war,	culture,	deception,	tool	use,	and	many	more.		We	have	recognized	that	other	organisms	exhibit	all	of	these	behaviors;	crows	plan,	and	use	tools,	chimps	war	exceedingly	well,	many	animals	deceive,	and	many	pass	down	cultural	knowledge,	skills,	and	social	organization.		The	“unique	to	human”	list	has	grown	perplexingly	brief.					There	are	multiple	behaviors,	however,	for	which	there	appear	to	be	human	and	nonhuman	“versions”;	human	behaviors	for	which	there	may	be	nonhuman	analogs	or	precursors.		Wherever	such	antecedent	capabilities	occur,	the	distinctions	may	be	studied	distinguishing	a	possibly-unique	human	version	from	nonhuman	versions.					These	human-nonhuman	pairs	of	behaviors	include	the	inference	powers	of	chimps,	as	potential	antecedents	of	human	formal	logic	(e.g.,	(Cesana-Arlotti	et	al.	2018;	Hanus	et	al.	2011;	De	Waal	2016));	“numerosity,”	possibly	partially	underlying	human	formal	mathematics	(Brannon	and	Terrace	1998;	MacLean	et	al.	2012);	various	calls,	vocalizations,	signals	and	other	communication	procedures	that	may	be	partial	precursors	to	human	language	(Berwick	et	al.	2011;	Beckers	et	al.	
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2012).		There	also	are	phenomena	of	cultural	learning	and	social	interaction	in	nonhumans,	that	may	prefigure	more	complex	human-specific	social	machinations	(Herrmann	et	al.	2007;	MacLean	et	al.	2012;	Suddendorf	and	Corbalis	2010;	Suddendorf	2013);	and	other	abilities	appearing	in	nonhumans	but	having	more	advanced	ostensible	counterparts	in	us.		Pinker	&	Jackendoff	(Pinker	and	Jackendoff	2004)	particularly	note	the	value	of	language,	and	its	utility	for	other	candidate	all-and-only	human	characteristics,	such	as	“a	reliance	on	acquired	know-how	and	a	high	degree	of	cooperation	among	non-kin”	(Pinker	and	Jackendoff	2004;	Tooby	and	DeVore	1987).		Suddendorf	(Suddendorf	2013)	lists	a	set	of	suggestive	terms	for	candidate	pairs	of	these	nonhuman–human	cognitive	counterparts:	communication	￫	language;	memory	￫	mental	time	travel;	social	reasoning	
￫ mindreading;	physical	reasoning	￫	theories;	empathy	￫	morality;	tradition	￫	culture.					In	each	case,	not	only	are	there	nonhuman	antecedents	to	human	abilities;	there	also	are	developmental	phases	in	human	infants,	before	a	full	uniquely-human	ability	has	appeared,	during	which	developing	humans	appear	to	exhibit	the	antecedent,	in	ways	that	may	be	identical	to	or	closely	corresponding	to	the	nonhuman	version.					
	
Thesis	A.1a)		Some	humans	can	do	things	that	the	majority	of	humans	cannot		The	editor	of	this	journal	likes	to	remind	his	students	(and	colleagues)	that,	as	far	as	we	know,	calculus	was	only	discovered	by	(at	most)	three	human	beings.		Everyone	else	had	it	taught	to	them.					We	all	live	in	houses	and	drive	cars	and	use	laptops.		A	tiny	number	of	those	reading	this	are	capable	of	building	a	house,	car,	or	laptop.		Or	even	a	bottle,	or	a	pencil.		We	may	not	be	able	to	readily	conceive	of	a	world	in	which	we	had	to	invent	almost	all	we	use,	or	discover	almost	all	we	know.		That	does	not	resemble	our	world.		It	does	resemble	the	world	of	non-human	animals.					One	human	discovered	(invented)	the	Turing	machine.		A	few	others	made	highly	related	similar	discoveries	(e.g.,	Church,	Hilbert,	Post,	Kleene).		All	the	rest	of	us	came	to	understand	Turing	machines	directly	via	instruction	stemming	from	those	initial	few,	a	drastically	simpler	achievement.		(An	intriguing,	but	separable,	question	is	whether	no	others	at	the	time	might	have	made	these	timely	discoveries	if	Turing,	Church,	and	others	had	not	existed).				The	difference	between	discovery	and	instruction	is	whether	or	not	someone	handed	you	the	fully-formed	set	of	information.		At	the	core	of	that	difference	is	the	deceptively	simple	fact	that	information	can	be	transmitted.		Doing	so	ineluctably	requires	a	medium	with	specific	characteristics:	it	must	be	able	to	be	recorded	on	and	read	from.		It	might	be	designated	as	an	external,	non-volatile	read-write	memory	system.		Put	simply:	writing	things	down.		Multiply	two	nine-digit	numbers?		All	but	impossible	in	your	head;	trivially	simple	on	paper.		The	distance	between	these	is	decisive.					As	discussed	in	detail	in	a	later	section,	the	sole	distinction	among	different	automata	are	their	memory	systems.		The	only	thing	that	separates	them	are	their	exact	capabilities	for	storage	and	retrieval.		A	Turing	machine	is	a	finite	state	machine,	plus	a	specific	set	of	added	storage	and	retrieval	mechanisms.					Much	more	on	this	later.		For	the	moment,	the	takeaway	is	this:	a	human	with	a	tape	recorder	(or	pencil	and	paper	or	chalk	or	tablet	or	laptop	or	camera)	is	not	at	all	the	same	thing	as	a	human	lacking	any	access	to	these.		In	our	own	everyday	lives,	these	are	so	inextricably	entangled	with	our	thoughts	and	behaviors	that	we	may	give	them	little	credit.		Take	away	the	storage	tape,	and	the	Turing	machine	is	not	a	Turing	machine:	it	is	a	finite	state	machine,	with	a	vastly	different	scale	of	
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computational	power.		Correspondingly,	take	away	our	external	storage	devices,	from	recorders	and	laptops	down	to	paper	and	pencil,	and	our	computing	power	may	be	enormously	diminished.		We	posit	that	commensurate	limitations	hold	for	biological	computing	engines	as	for	artificial	ones.						In	both	cases,	the	fundamental	question	at	the	heart	of	computational	measurement	is	the	one	asked	at	the	beginning	of	this	article:	what	machinery	confers	what	powers?				
Thesis	A.2)	There	is	a	compact	set	of	human	ubiquitous	and	unique	(all-and-only)	capabilities	Most	human	abilities	do	not	arise	inborn,	like	a	foal’s	ability	to	walk;	rather,	they	each	appear	to	emerge	at	roughly	prescribed	latencies,	in	putative	correspondence	with	developmental	stages:	evidence	clearly	distinguishes	different	ages	at	which	children	exhibit	specific	concepts	of	numeric	capacities,	mental	time	travel,	theory	of	mind,	and	others.					During	the	evolution	of	the	primates,	it	might	have	been	the	case	that	different	cognitive	advances	arose	in	different	taxa.		One	could	posit	a	species	with,	for	instance,	human-level	mathematics,	but	lacking	mental	time-travel,	advanced	cultural	learning,	and	morality.		Or	a	species	with	logical	inference	and	advanced	social	mindreading,	lacking	any	advanced	numerical	abilities,	morality,	and	natural	language.				Surprisingly,	evidence	suggests	that	none	of	these	abilities	occur	independently	in	different	species;	they	all	evidently	arise	simultaneously	in	a	single	species.		Our	recent	relatives	include	a	set	of	possible	ancestors	whose	constituency	continues	to	grow	rapidly	as	new	discoveries	become	sequenced.		These	include	Neanderthals;	Denisovans	(Krause	et	al.	2010)	and	other	possible	paleo	Siberians;	recently	reported	Homo	luzonensis	(Détroit	et	al.	2019).		Since	all	of	these	other	than	Neanderthals	have	been	discovered	within	the	past	few	years,	it	is	not	unreasonable	to	imagine	that	other	recent	hominins	may	be	found.		It	is	notable	in	this	regard	that	the	vast	majority	of	“anatomically	modern	human”	fossils	have	not	been	sequenced.		If	there	were	species	who	exhibited	subsets	of	the	above	list	of	“uniquely	human”	abilities,	they	are	extinct	and	their	mental	abilities	currently	are	impossible	to	ascertain.		Homo	sapiens	–	the	sole	known	species	that	has	any	of	the	“human”	versions	of	these	capacities	–	has	all	of	them.		Quite	possibly,	all	of	these	abilities	arose	phylogenetically	at	once,	in	us.					These	circumstances	intimate	a	possible	link	among	these	abilities,	rather	than	coincidental	coöccurrence.		The	question	of	dependencies	among	these	abilities	is	unanswered.		To	what	extent	do	any	of	these	abilities	depend	on	other	abilities	–	is	there	some	ur-ability	that	is	both	necessary	and	sufficient	for	the	emergence	of	this	plethora	of	seemingly-disparate	capacities?			A2a)	Numerosity	“Numerosity,”	a	reduced	version	of	numeric	abilities,	appear	to	arrive	relatively	early	(e.g.,	4	to	6	month	old	children,	notably	before	onset	of	uniquely	human	language	abilities.		By	contrast,	the	strict	human	ability	to	count	(which	also	entails	at	least	learning	the	words	for	numbers),	typically	does	not	appear	before	roughly	age	6;	Gelman	&	Gallistel	(Gelman	and	Gallistel	1978)	proposed	principles	that	counting	is	dependent	on,	including	“abstractness,”	meaning	any	objects	can	be	counted,	“cardinality,”	i.e.,	the	ability	to	arrive	at	an	announced	number	(such	as	“5”:	1,2,3,4,5),	“order	irrelevance,”	meaning	the	ability	to	start	with	any	of	the	objects	being	counted	(not	just,	e.g.,	the	leftmost	object),	and	“one-to-one”	assignment,	i.e.,	any	given	object	is	counted	only	once,	wherever	it	occurs	in	the	sequence.				
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Correspondingly,	development	of	logic	was	assumed	by	Piaget	(Piaget	1952)	to	be	intrinsically	linked	with	that	of	number:	“a	pre-numerical	period	corresponds	to	a	pre-logical	level,”	and	“logical	and	arithmetical	operations	therefore	constitute	a	single	system	that	is	psychologically	natural,	the	second	resulting	from	a	generalisation	and	fusion	of	the	first...”.		Infants’	“numerosity”	abilities	have	been	cited	as	evidence	against	this	view,	but	such	an	argument	may	be	seen	as	conflating	the	nonhuman	version	of	number	sense	(numerosity)	with	strictly	human	arithmetic	abilities	that	do	not	arise	until	far	later	in	development.		There	is	evidence	that	by	roughly	age	5,	children	have	acquired	relatively	simple	arithmetic	principles	such	as	“complementarity”:		if	adding	two	and	four	results	in	six,	then	taking	two	away	from	six	must	equal	four.		Before	that	age,	evidence	indicates	that	children	as	old	as	3	to	5	still	do	not	have	this	concept	(Starkey	and	Gelman	1982;	Starkey,	Spelke,	and	Gelman	1990).		Very	interestingly,	19-month	infants	looked	longer	when	an	object	A	surprisingly	appeared	where	B	was	thought	to	be	(Cesana-Arlotti	et	al.	2018);	12-month-olds	exhibited	concordant	(albeit	less	statistically	significant)	behavior;	these	may	be	evidence	of	logic	(specifically,	modus	tollendo	ponens),	although	simpler	hypotheses	remain	consistent	with	the	data	(Jasbi	et	al.	2019).					A2b)	Theory	of	mind;	perspective-taking	Knowledge	of	what	another	agent	knows	and	intends	(“theory	of	mind”)	similarly	appears	to	have	nonhuman	and	human	versions.		Chimpanzees	may	be	able	to	infer	whether	other	chimpanzees	do	or	do	not	know	the	whereabouts	of	some	hidden	object	(Hare,	Call,	and	Tomasello	2001)	whereas	chimps	evidently	fail	to	infer	whether	or	not	a	human	knows	such	a	location(Povinelli,	Nelson,	and	Boysen	1990).		And	again,	correspondingly,	humans	develop	these	abilities	over	time,	from	early	(7-9	months)	knowledge	of	whether	someone	is	paying	attention	(Baron-Cohen	1991),	to	the	eventual	ability	to	recognize	different	desires	in	different	others,	and	to	the	understanding	that	a	person	may	have	false	beliefs	(Sue	thinks	the	toy	is	in	the	box,	but	Bill	removed	it	when	Sue	wasn’t	looking).		(And	encompassing	these	theory-of-mind	abilities,	the	further	ability	of	perspective-taking	enables	a	human	to	perceive	or	conceptualize	what	the	environment	or	situation	looks	like	from	that	other	person’s	mental	point	of	view.)			It	is	not	known	whether	abilities	such	as	language	and	theory-of-mind	develop	together	just	coincidentally,	or	whether	one	depends	on	the	other	(Milligan,	Astington,	and	Dack	2007;	Miller	2006).				
 
Figure 4				
Figure 4.  Evidence of quantitative 
cognitive distinctions.  Human and 
nonhuman primates were tested 
on physical tasks (e.g., locating an 
object, discriminating quantities, 
etc.) and “social” tasks (observing 
and using a conspecific’s solution; 
communicating a location; 
following a gaze to a target).  
Species were not significantly 
different on physical tasks but 
differed on “social” tasks ... once 
“outliers” are omitted (gray dots).  
(Adapted from Herrmann et al ’07).  
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A2c)	Mental	time	travel	Humans	are	able	to	conceive	and	report	on	both	past	events	and	future	events,	including	those	that	did	not	take	place	or	will	not	take	place	(e.g.,	counterfactuals	such	as	“what	would	the	U.S.	be	like	if	the	Nazis	had	won,”	or	“which	college	will	I	choose	if	I’m	admitted	to	both”).				As	with	numerosity	and	theory	of	mind,	there	are	primate	precursors	of	this	ability	(Osvath,	Raby,	and	Clayton	2010;	Cheke	and	Clayton	2010;	Suddendorf	and	Corbalis	2010).		And,	as	with	numerosity	and	theory	of	mind,	there	a	developmental	trajectory	through	which	children	pass	before	exhibiting	the	full	ability	by	roughly	age	3-5	(Suddendorf	and	Redshaw	2013;	Redshaw	and	Suddendorf	2016).						A2d)	Seriality	Human	language,	counting,	and	other	abilities	are	serial	by	definition:	event	“b”	(word	or	number)	cannot	occur	until	after	event	“a”.				For	some	human	abilities,	such	as	comprehending	a	conspecific’s	intentionality,	the	quality	of	seriality	is	not	at	all	obvious;	whether	or	not	it	is	a	feature	of	this	ability	is	an	open	question.		(As	mentioned,	nonhuman	primates	do	not	have	the	same	mind-reading	abilities	as	humans,	and	human	children	go	through	an	early	stage	where	they	appear	to	conspicuously	lack	this	mind-reading	ability.		This	suggests	the	possibility	that	some	later	capacity	is	required	for	the	full	ability.		That	later	capacity,	such	as	some	form	of	logical	inference,	may	entail	seriality.)		Given	the	colossal	parallelism	of	brains,	the	inherent	seriality	of	language,	counting,	and	other	human	behaviors	may	appear	unexpected	or	even	paradoxical.		Although	most	computation	in	brain	circuits	is	carried	out	in	parallel,	all	such	computations	are	internal.		All	input	to	and	output	from	these	computations	is	necessarily	serial.		These	distinctions	may	bear	some	correspondence	with	others	in	the	literature	such	as	“fast”	and	“slow”	behaviors(Kahneman	2011),	i.e.,	pre-linguistic,	intuitive	thought,	versus	behaviors	that	call	on	some	form	of	(serial)	logic	or	language.				Syntactic	structure	in	language	is	structured	and	hierarchical.		Yet	any	information	in	such	structures	must	also	be	rendered	into	serial	sequence	in	order	for	it	to	be	recognized	or	produced:	we	notoriously	can	only	say,	or	hear,	one	word	at	a	time.		Seriality	is	in	some	ways	so	obvious	and	pervasive	(all	logic,	all	language)	that	it	may	be	readily	overlooked.				A2e)	Working	memory	“Working	memory”	is	variously	described	as	a	“limited	capacity”	system	for	temporarily	holding	information,	in	which	new	input	causes	older	items	to	be	dropped;	these	held	memories	are	crucial	for	decision	making	in	real	time.		Working	memory	typically	refers	not	just	to	temporary	storage	of	information,	but	also	active	on-line	manipulation	of	that	information	(Goldman-Rakic	1995);	it	designates	maintenance	of	information	about	an	event	for	some	time,	in	the	absence	of	reinforcement,	that	can	be	used	to	guide	behavior	at	a	later	time	(Miller,	Galanter,	and	Pribram	1960;	Baddeley	1992).					As	will	be	discussed	in	detail	in	the	following	sections,	the	frontal	cortical	regions,	which	are	consistently	tied	with	working	memory	(Goldman-Rakic	1988),	expand	proportionately	far	more	than	any	other	brain	structures.		Whereas	a	human	brain	is	routinely	characterized	as	being	roughly	3.5	times	larger	than	the	brain	of	a	nonhuman	ape	of	the	same	body	size,	the	frontal	cortex	of	that	same	human	brain	is	roughly	seven	times	larger	than	the	ape’s	corresponding	frontal	cortex.		It	might	be	expected	that	functions	linked	with	frontal	cortex	may	exhibit	commensurate	increases.			
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		A	plethora	of	definitions	of	“working	memory”	make	it	difficult	to	consistently	characterize,	let	alone	quantify.		A	recent	metastudy	(Lind,	Enquist,	and	Ghirlanda	2015)	indicated	no	obvious	correlation	between	working	memory	duration	and	relative	brain	size	or	encephalization	quotient	(see	also	(Carruthers	2013)	for	further	review).		In	particular,	primates	did	not	exhibit	longer	working	memories	than	rats.		However,	a	range	of	relatively	recent	studies	provide	evidence	that	humans	exhibit	a	substantially	larger	working	memory	when	semantic	relations	are	introduced	(Brady,	Störmer,	and	Alvarez	2016),	possibly	akin	to	“chunking”	(Cowan,	Chen,	and	Rouder	2004;	Laird,	Rosenbloom,	and	Newell	1984);	such	studies	question	the	applicability	of	standard	testing	regimens	for	working	memory.					A2f)	Are	the	all-and-only	human	abilities	interrelated?			Human	language	is	strictly	species-specific.		And	(barring	brain	disorders)	every	human	has	it:	language	is	acquired	with	little	to	no	training,	merely	exposure,	requiring	no	evident	effort	or	strain.		This	is	dramatically	different	from	language	training	attempts	in	nonhumans,	which	are	vastly	effortful	and	as	yet	have	yielded	at	best	highly	questionable	results,	drastically	separating	human	language	from	animal	communication	systems.				This	effortlessly-acquired	human	language	capability	sets	us	drastically	above	other	animals.		Even	more	advanced	abilities,	equally	unique	to	humans,	such	as	logic	or	math,	or	even	writing,	are	utterly	unlike	language	in	that	a	huge	percentage	of	humans	will	never	learn	them,	and	those	who	do	will	require	enormous	training,	sustained	effort,	and	irreplaceable	reliance	on	external	aids	such	as	blackboards,	recordings,	textbooks.		(Multiplying	two	seven	digit	numbers	is	trivial	with	pencil	and	paper,	and	highly	nontrivial	without.		The	differences	are	of	primary	interest.		Distinctions	of	course	matter	very	much	if	we	wish	to	understand	the	nature	of	unique	and	ubiquitous	human	abilities.)		It	is	intriguing	to	consider	that	advanced	math	may	be	as	different	from	language,	as	language	is	from	other	animal	communication;	the	struggles	of	an	ape	learning	language	may	be	comparable	to	those	of	a	student	learning	calculus.				As	described,	multiple	other	capacities	besides	language	–	such	as	the	human	theory	of	mind	ability,	human	cultural	transmission,	human	mental	time	travel,	human	perspective-taking,	human	moral	rules	–	may	be	similarly	categorized	if	they,	too,	arise	in	all	of	us,	with	negligible	training	or	externalities.					This	seemingly	intrinsic	level	of	human	ability	–	the	all-and-only	tasks	–	may	arise	from	a	proposed	core	set	of	abilities.		It	may	be	that	no	single	one	of	these	tasks	(e.g.,	language)	comprises	the	essence	of	that	core;	rather,	multiple	seemingly-disparate	abilities	may	arise	from	the	capacities	of	that	core.				Grammatically	separate	statements	such	as	“the	child	hit	the	car”	and	“the	car	hit	the	child”	evoke	notably	distinct	images.		Evidence	suggests	that	the	resulting	syntactically-composited	concepts	engage	very	late-appearing	telencephalic	brain	areas	(such	as	anterior	temporal	cortex);	these	may	be	distinguishing	among	semantic	roles	arising	from	the	events,	whether	linguistically	or	visually	presented.		That	is,	expanded	cortical	regions	are	recruited	to	process	the	roles	arising	in	complex	grammatical	formulations;	see,	e.g.,	(Frankland	and	Greene	2014).				Evidence	indicates	that	successive	cortical	regions	are	selectively	recruited	to	process	longer	and	longer	patterns,	whether	auditory,	linguistic,	or	video	(e.g.,	(Griffiths	et	al.	1998;	Hasson	et	al.	2008;	Farbood	et	al.	2015)),	and	some	findings	have	linked	hierarchical	language	syntactic	structure	to	a	sequential	hierarchy	of	cortical	time	scales	that	correspond	to	grammar	construction	(Ding	et	al.	
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2015).		These	all	may	be	seen	as	instances	of	the	general	principle	that	successive	cortical	regions	process	incrementally	expanded	grammar	rewrite-rule	expressions.				The	key	questions	raised	are	these:	- what	quantitative	measures	exist	for	each	proposed	all-and-only	human	capacity?	- what	dependencies	may	obtain	among	these	capacities:	are	some	contingent	on	others?	- in	general,	what	are	the	inclusion	criteria	for	identifying	all-and-only	capacities	in	humans?					If	we	want	to	know	what	type	of	machine	we	intrinsically	are,	then	we	may	ask:	what	are	the	most	powerful	abilities	that	are	bestowed	on	all	humans	and	only	humans?		For	any	sufficiently	powerful	“all-and-only”	ability,	we	may	wish	to	identify	what	kind	of	underlying	computational	mechanism	suffices	to	produce	it.				(We	may	also	ask	a	reciprocal	question:	if	some	specific	computational	power	(e.g.,	Turing-equivalent)	is	claimed	for	human	cognition,	what	exactly	are	the	capacities	that	would	be	conferred	uniquely	and	ubiquitously	on	humans	by	those	computational	powers?		In	what	ways	can	we	measure	their	manifestations	in	human	behavior	and	cognition?)				Many	of	these	all-and-only	abilities	are	as	yet	exceedingly	difficult	to	accurately	quantify.		It	is	notably	difficult	to	fashion	a	quantitative	y-axis	for	theory	of	mind,	for	cultural	transmission,	for	perspective-taking.		In	contrast,	there	is	a	large	literature	of	quantitative	measures	of	human	language	abilities.				
Thesis	A.3)	Human	natural	language	characteristics	have	been	consistently	and	replicably	quantified		As	already	noted,	although	there	are	extensive	literatures	discussing	correspondences	and	distinctions	among	human	versus	nonhuman	versions	of	cognitive	capabilities,	such	distinctions	are	(unsurprisingly)	predominantly	qualitative.					In	this	respect,	the	literature	on	human	natural	language	properties	is	an	anomaly:	the	attributes	of	natural	language	syntax,	an	all-and-only	human	capacity,	has	repeatedly	been	quantitatively	characterized.				Beginning	in	the	1980s,	several	groups	of	researchers,	from	multiple	different	institutions,	independently	engaged	in	ventures	aimed	at	quantitatively	appraising	the	formal	characteristics	of	human	natural	language.		These	investigations	proceeded	by	taking	corpora	of	various	languages,	and	analyzing	the	types	of	syntactic	transformations	that	occur	and	do	not	occur,	i.e.,	that	are	accepted	or	“not	accepted”	in	the	language.		This	is	not	proscriptive,	i.e.,	these	are	not	judgments	of	what	“ought”	to	be	accepted,	but	rather	what	native	speakers	judge	(with	surprising	ease	and	consensus)	as	actually,	intrinsically,	acceptable	versus	unacceptable.		(“Who	do	you	wonder	whether	they	will	come”;	“John	is	very	tall,	doesn’t	he?”).		Notably,	these	judgments	also	readily	accept	syntactically	well-formed	but	semantically	nonsensical	statements;	“Colorless	green	ideas	slept	furiously”	is	(famously)	quite	readable,	and	even	graphically	evocative,	whether	or	not	it	makes	any	semantic	sense.				These	analyses	of	language	size	span	Ph.D.	theses,	journal	articles,	and	books;	multiple	languages	and	continents;	and	decades.		What	is	nothing	short	of	shocking	is	that	these	studies,	almost	all	of	them,	from	different	research	groups,	including	rancorously	competing	ones,	have	arrived	at	the	same	closely	circumscribed	set	of	grammars	characterizing	natural	languages	(Joshi,	Vijay-Shanker,	and	Weir	1991;	Vijay-Shanker	and	Weir	1994;	Pullum	and	Gazdar	1982;	Shieber	1985).			
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(Acquisition	of	natural	language	notably	can’t	be	tested	“in	the	wild”	except	by	observation.		Natural	language	acquisition	is	notably	unsupervised	and	rapid,	when	it	is	developmentally	early;	second	language	learning	typically	lacks	the	feeling	of	“effortlessness”	that	appears	to	be	characteristic	of	developmental	language	acquisition.		Researchers	have	constructed	artificial	sequences	that	variously	conform	to	properties	of	natural	languages	in	order	to	run	more	controlled	experiments	on	acquisition.		These	“artificial	grammar	learning”	(AGL)	experiments	have	largely	accorded	with	hypotheses	about	natural	language	learning	(see,	e.g.,	(Fitch	and	Friederici	2012)	for	review).		Subjects	are	presented	with	“sentences”	or	“strings”	that	are	generated	by	a	set	of	rules	corresponding	to	grammars	of	different	types	in	the	grammar	hierarchy;	these	presented	strings	can	lead	to	learning	of	regularities,	which	are	often	described	as	“implicit”	learning	–	because	the	generative	rules	underlying	the	presented	artificial	“sentences”	are	never	explicitly	presented.		Confusingly,	in	some	experimental	paradigms,	the	strings	are	just	exposed	to	subjects,	without	training	or	feedback,	whereas	in	other	paradigms,	subjects	are	told	which	strings	are	of	one	type	and	which	are	another	(something	that	does	not	occur	in	natural	language	acquisition).		The	conflation	of	these	highly	different	methodologies	causes	misunderstandings	in	the	field.		Nonetheless,	certain	types	of	evidence	have	been	presented	for	very	small	artificial	languages	being	treated	in	ways	argued	to	be	concordant	with	early-acquired	full	languages	(Friederici,	Steinhauer,	and	Pfeifer	2002).)						(In	an	unrelated	controversy,	it	was	recently	argued	that	the	native	language	of	a	particular	tribe	may	have	contained	no	embedded	clauses.		We	here	are	solely	concerned	with	human	capacities.		For	studying	the	computational	power	of	human	cognition,	the	sole	relevant	point	is	that	some	tribe	members	were	raised	with	Portuguese	as	their	native	language,	and	they	did	learn	embedded	clauses.		These	peoples’	language	capacities	are	the	same	as	those	of	other	humans.		We	are	seeking	the	properties	that	all	humans	and	only	humans	have,	and	the	members	of	that	tribe	clearly	have	them.)						In	simplest	terms,	so-called	“context	free”	grammars	are	shown	to	be	too	small	to	explain	some	explicit	examples	from	natural	languages,	whereas	so-called	“context	sensitive”	grammars	are	shown	to	be	too	broad,	spuriously	accepting	utterances	that	are	easily	shown	to	not	occur	in	natural	languages.		A	grammar	size	that	is	formally	greater	than	context	free,	and	lesser	than	context	sensitive,	has	been	shown	to	fit	the	data.		(In	detail,	analyses	of	some	natural	languages	have	concluded	that	context	free	grammars	suffice	(e.g.,	(Pullum	and	Gazdar	1982));	for	some	languages,	context	free	is	too	small	a	class.		No	natural	languages	have	ever	been	shown	to	be	the	full	size	of	context	sensitive	grammars.)				
Thesis	A.4)	A	core	capacity?			Counting,	logic,	perspective-taking;	...	these	brief	references	are	in	no	way	meant	to	constitute	an	exhaustive	list;	rather,	they	are	meant	as	an	introduction	to	a	substantial	category:		well-studied	non-human	precursors	to	unique	human	abilities.		As	mentioned,	many	such	abilities	appear	to	follow	this	pattern:			i) an	antecedent	capability	present	in	nonhumans	and	humans,	and	sometimes	present	in	preliminary	form	during	human	ontogeny	(“ancestral”);	ii) a	capability	that	is	uniquely	easy	for	humans	to	developmentally	acquire,	but	very	difficult	or	impossible	for	nonhumans	(“all-and-only”);	iii) an	advanced	human	capability	requiring	extensive	training	and	external	equipment	(“adept”).			
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These	three	stages	or	versions	of	an	ability	may	successively	depend	on	each	other,	building	up	via	some	form	of	added	capacities	that	lift	an	organism	from	one	level	of	capability	to	the	next.		The	intended	focus	is	the	category	of	‘all-and-only,’	uniquely	anthropic,	capabilities.					In	light	of	these	seeming	relations	among	capabilities,	we	forward	the	possibility	of	a	core	capacity,	occurring	solely	in	humans,	surpassing	nonhuman	precursor	abilities;	that	is	universally	present	among	humans,	barring	pathology.		That	is:	all	humans,	and	only	humans.		Such	unique	and	ubiquitous	abilities	would	be	acquired	along	a	developmental	trajectory	even	without	any	explicit	training,	solely	unsupervisedly,	simply	via	exposure	to	the	relevant	data.				The	next	two	sections	first	describe	the	unique	all-and-only	characteristics	of	human	neuroanatomy,	and	then	discuss	and	illustrate	the	automata	hierarchy.		Then	we	will	return	to	the	central	question:		where	does	human	cognition	reside	in	that	hierarchy?							
B)		Comparative	neuroanatomy	of	humans	and	other	primates		
Thesis	B.1)	Primate	brains	are	allometrically	uniform	Human	brains	are	in	some	ways	evolutionary	“kludges,”	amalgams	of	randomly	appended	faculties	that	have	been	accreted	over	roughly	200	million	years	of	mammalian	evolution,	4	million	years	of	primate	evolution,	and	then	some	hundreds	of	thousands	of	years	of	uniquely	homo	sapiens	evolution	(Lynch	and	Granger	2008;	Striedter	2005).				However,	when	we	address	mammalian	evolution	in	terms	of	ongoing	adaptations,	we	face	a	stark	puzzle:	the	range	of	structural	variation	differentiating	mammal	brains	is	extraordinarily	limited;	mammalian	brains	are	so	much	alike,	aside	from	simple	size	differences,	that	human	brains	are	referred	to	in	the	literature	as	simply	“scaled-up	chimp	brains”	(Herculano-Houzel	2009;	Herculano-Houzel	et	al.	2007).		The	ongoing	search	for	substantive	differences	between	human	and	other	brains	keeps	turning	up	seeming	minutiae,	with	no	apparent	explanatory	power	over	the	extent	of	humans’	difference	from	other	primates	(Rodriguez	and	Granger	2016).		That	is,	primate	brain	variation	is	miniscule,	begging	the	question	of	where	unique	human	abilities	could	be	coming	from.		As	brain	size	scales	across	four	orders	of	magnitude	in	the	mammals,	every	component	brain	part	stays	intact,	and,	with	phenomenal	precision,	even	the	exact	ratios	among	brain	parts	(e.g.,	cortical	to	subcortical	size	ratios)	vary	in	strictly	predictable	allometric	correspondences.		The	few	specific	deviations	from	this	rule	(e.g.,	olfactory	cortex	in	primates)	establish	that	evolution	is	quite	capable	of	diverging	from	the	rigid	allometric	constraints,	and	yet,	save	for	these	few	exceptions,	the	allometry	is	stringently	adhered	to.				Thus,	apart	from	these	rare	exceptions,	brain	organization	has	astoundingly	little	leeway	to	expand	or	contract	some	structures	at	the	expense	of	others	in	response	to	presumed	evolutionary	pressures.		This	represents	a	compelling	constraint	on	interpretations	of	human	brain	specializations.				
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Figure 5	
  	Of	crucial	importance	is	the	simple	fact	that	evolutionary	advances	need	not	“optimize”	anything,	such	as	making	mechanisms	simpler	or	more	efficient.		Allometry	startlingly	illustrates	the	lack	of	substantive	variation	among	brains	and	the	almost	unbelievably	rigid	consistency	of	size	and	connectivity	relations	throughout	mammalian	brain	structures.		(Indeed,	it	was	not	widely	incorporated	into	the	literature	until	the	groundbreaking	allometric	publications	of	Finlay	&	Darlington	(Finlay	and	Darlington	1995)	and	colleagues,	building	on	the	extensive	metrics	obtained	by	Stephan	et	al.	(Stephan,	Frahm,	and	Baron	1981;	Stephan,	Baron,	and	Frahm	1986).)					Some	size,	shape,	or	connectivity	changes	do	occur	beyond	the	allometrically-determined;	such	“mosaic”	modifications	are	surprisingly	rare,	and,	even	when	they	occur,	are	very	small	(typically	representing	changes	of	less	than	a	percent	in	predicted	size).					
Thesis	B.2)	Human	anterior	cortex	is	almost	an	order	of	magnitude	larger	than	for	any	other	primate	The	allometric	slope	for	neocortex	is	higher	than	one,	that	is,	as	brain	size	increases,	neocortex	grows	to	be	a	proportionately	larger	percentage	of	the	brain.		In	general,	the	phylogenetically	later	the	cortical	region,	the	higher	the	slope	(Finlay	and	Darlington	1995;	Herculano-Houzel	2012).		Anterior	cortical	regions	such	as	dorsolateral	prefrontal	(dlPFC)	and	area	10	become	proportionately	even	larger	than	other	cortical	areas,	albeit	in	allometrically	predictable	fashion	(Semendeferi	et	al.	2002).			For	instance,	the	frontal	pole,	or	Brodmann	area	10,	is	argued	to	exist	in	all	mammalian	species	(but	see	Preuss	(Preuss	2000)).		Area	10	is	large	in	primates	and	is	very	disproportionately	large	in	humans:	it	occupies	about	0.74%	of	total	brain	volume	in	primates	such	as	bonobos	(and	far	smaller	percentages	in	other	mammals),	but	area	10	constitutes	roughly	1.2%	of	human	brains,	all	the	while	conforming	exactly	to	the	size	that	is	predicted	by	simple	known	allometric	relations	among	primate	brains.					That	is,	simply	by	knowing	the	overall	size	of	a	human	brain,	we	may	allometrically	predict	the	size	of	its	components,	such	as	area	10,	with	remarkable	empirical	precision	(Fig	6)	.						
Figure 5. Neocortex (including 
posterior and anterior), with an 
allometric slope greater than 1, 
occupies an ever-larger 
percentage of the brain as 
overall primate brain size 
increases.  (From Striedter ‘05).  
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Figure 6		Some	areas	within	a	human	brain	are	roughly	the	same	size	as	those	in	the	ape	brain,	whereas	most	are	disproportionately	much	larger,	due	to	the	different	allometric	slopes	for	each	brain	region.		The	highest	slopes	belong	to	anterior	cortical	regions.		The	average	brain	area	is	roughly	three	times	larger	than	that	of	an	ape	–	but	the	anterior	cortical	regions	such	as	dlPFC,	area	10,	and	other	prefrontal	regions,	are	roughly	eight	times	larger.						A	leap	of	this	size,	almost	an	order	of	magnitude	–	specifically	in	brain	areas	that	appear	central	to	higher	cognitive	processes	–	is	unprecedented	among	the	primates.		The	changes	emerge,	as	do	almost	all	major	changes	among	primates,	from	the	standard	rules	of	allometry;	yet	the	sheer	size	of	these	anterior	cortical	regions	makes	them	difficult	to	classify	as	gradual.					(Although	Tattersall	(Tattersall	2017)	quite	correctly	points	out	that	“brain	size	increase	was	a	property	of	the	Homo	clade	in	general,”	he	uses	this	to	assert	that,	therefore,	brain	size	increase	“evidently	had	nothing	to	do	with	how	modern	Homo	sapiens,	specifically,	did	or	does	its	cognitive	business.”		By	contrast,	we	are	highlighting	the	fact	that	human	brains	represent	a	colossal	leap	of	unprecedented	size,	which	cannot	be	ruled	out	as	having	something	very	much	to	do	with	present-day	humans’	cognitive	capabilities.		The	question	of	intermediate	brains	in	our	lineage	still	remains	unanswered,	but	it	cannot	be	used	to	discount	the	role	of	enormous	allometric	circuit	expansion	in	our	brains.)						Intermediate	sizes	did	allometrically	appear	in	other	hominins,	during	the	extraordinary	burst	of	growth	during	the	past	2.5	million	years.		Since	those	species	are	gone,	we	have	no	information	about	their	possibly	intermediate	abilities,	nor	whether	they	too	may	have	crossed	a	threshold	that	gave	them	language	or	other	abilities	that	today	are	uniquely	human.		It	is	often	noted	that	these	abilities	per	se	are	insufficient	to	account	for	the	radical	success	of	humans;	the	abilities	also	had	to	occur	within	populations	that	were	sufficiently	large	to	enable	communication	to	confer	further	advantages.		Evidence	indicates	that	other	external	technological	milestones	(such	as	the	standard	panoply	of	fire,	cooking,	agriculture)	were	also	crucial	steps	–	but	of	course	none	of	them	help	explain	the	acquisition	of	new	abilities,	nor	would	any	externalities	have	remotely	sufficed	in	the	absence	of	the	uniquely	human	abilities	that	enabled	them	in	the	first	place.				
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Figure 6.  Logarithmic plot of 
area 10 cortex volume vs. 
remainder of telencephalon for 
six primates (gibbon, orangutan, 
gorilla, bonobo, chimp, human).  
The slope of greater than 1 is 
consistent across the primates; 
best-fit regression line is shown 
flanked by (dotted) prediction 
interval. The proprtion of the 
brain allocated to area 10 will 
substantially increase as overall 
brain size grows larger.  
(Adapted from Semendefari 02) 
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Thesis	B.3)	Brain	circuitry	predominantly	consists	of	cortical-subcortical	loops	Cortical-subcortical	loop	circuitry	(including	cortico-thalamic,	cortico-striatal,	and	cortico-hippocampal	loops)	constitutes	more	than	98%	of	human	brains	by	volume	(and	roughly	35%	of	rat	brains).		Figure	7	shows	the	repeated	pattern	of	connectivity	that	is	shared	across	all	the	primates	(and	all	the	mammals):	cortex	is	invariably	acting	not	alone,	but	in	concert	with	multiple	subcortical	regions	(Alexander	and	DeLong	1985).				
						  
Figure 7		
Thesis	B.4)	Brain	circuit	simulations	and	analyses	find	cortico-thalamic	loops	compute	grammars	Extensive	simulation	and	analysis	of	the	physiological	operation	of	these	anatomical	circuits	concluded	that	individual	loops	created	both	categories	(via	topographic	thalamocortical	and	cortico-cortical	projections)	and	sequences	(via	the	far	more	prevalent	nontopographic	or	diffuse	matrix	thalamocortical	and	cortico-cortical	connectivity	(Herkenham	1986;	Scheibel	and	Scheibel	1967;	Barbas	and	Rempel-Clower	1997;	Batardiere	et	al.	2002;	Budd	and	Kisvarday	2012;	Rockland	2004;	Swadlow,	Gusev,	and	Bezdudnaya	2002).		The	output	of	a	given	cortical	area	becomes	input	(both	divergent	and	convergent)	to	other,	downstream,	regions,	as	well	as	receiving	feedback	from	them.		Producing	categories	and	sequences,	in	cortico-cortical	succession,	yields	sequences	of	categories,	and	categories	of	sequences	of	categories,	etc.		This	hypothesized	primary	computation	of	thalamo-cortico-cortical	circuitry	(Swadlow,	Gusev,	and	Bezdudnaya	2002;	George	and	Hawkins	2009;	Granger	2006;	Rodriguez	and	Granger	2016)	is	formally	equivalent	to	grammars.							Extended	networks	produce	successively	nested	grammars	of	increasing	depth	(concordant	with	findings	that	increasingly	long	auditory	patterns	are	selectively	processed	by	successively	downstream	cortical	regions).		A	single	category	at	any	one	cortical	locus	can	itself	be	part	of	another	entire	sequence	of	categories.				
Figure 7.  Strictly patterned cortical-
subcortical loops dominate all 
forebrain circuitry.  A given posterior 
cortical (PC) region innervates a 
corresponding anterior cortical (AC) 
region and a matched striatal (S) 
region; the AC area targets that striatal 
region, engaging a striatal-pallidal-
thalamic (S,P,T) loop back to the same 
AC site; both pallidal and cortical 
(pyramidal tract) efferents activate 
lower motor structures (rightward 
arrows).  Loops of this kind exist for 
visual, auditory, somatosensory, 
perirhinal, and limbic systems, 
establishing an extraordinarily 
widespread forebrain architecture, 
presumably organizing the vast 
majority of all cognitive function.    
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Figure 8		Figure	8	is	a	simple	illustration	of	the	hierarchical	nature	of	nested	grammars;	these	are	illustrated	with	English	word	sequences,	but	extensive	work	has	demonstrated	how	these	structures	occur	in,	and	explain,	similarly	hierarchical	processing	of	other	stimuli	from	auditory	and	visual	to	abstract	cognitive	constructs	(Zhu	and	Mumford	2006;	Grenander	1996	;	Felzenszwalb	2011;	Geman,	Potter,	and	Chi	2002;	Chandrashekar	and	Granger	2012).				In	general,	these	formal	grammars	have	no	necessary	relation	to	language;	they	are	formal	constructs	arising	from	simulated	cortical-subcortical	performance,	operating	on	any	inputs	that	occur,	beginning	with	simple	sensory	inputs	and	continuing	downstream	to	construct	ever-larger	grammars.				A	criticial	characteristic	of	these	systems	is	their	production	of	a	form	of	representation	that	is	absent	from	typical	artificial	schemes	whether	unsupervised,	supervised,	or	reinforcement	based.		That	is	the	existence	of	“position-based	categories.”		These	are	readily	illustrated	using	linguistic	examples,	but	as	just	described,	their	formulation	is	independent	of	language,	and	may	apply	equivalently	to	representation	across	other	domains,	from	perception	to	reasoning.		If	“John	hit	a	tree,”	and	“John	hit	a	ball,”	then	“ball”	and	“tree”	are	in	a	category	–	not	a	similarity-based	category,	as	in	unsupervised	systems,	because	ball	and	tree	may	have	no	shared	or	similar	characteristics;	not	a	labeled	category,	since	no	supervised	information	is	presented;	nor	a	reinforcement	category,	since	no	reinforcement	information	is	presented.		Rather,	the	category	is	based	on	its	position,	or	role:	it	is	something	that	can	follow	“hit,”	or	something	that	can	be	hit	(i.e.,	the	“patient”	role	of	hit).		These	“position-based”	categories	are	of	a	different	nature	than	the	three	others	(similarity,	labeled,	reinforced).		The	ongoing	development	of	sequence-	and	context-based	learning	systems	suggest	promising	potential	directions	(Lund	and	Burgess	1996;	Bullinaria	and	Levy	2007;	Mikolov	et	al.	2013;	Pennington,	Socher,	and	Manning	2014).				Only	some	of	these	systems	are	generative,	and	as	such	they	yield	richer	representations	than	simple	“discriminative”	mechanisms,	yet	generative	systems	typically	are	shown	to	be	more	computationally	expensive	than	discriminative	algorithms	(Ng	and	Jordan	2002).		It	is	notable	that	the	grammar	mechanisms	derived	from	cortical-subcortical	loop	circuitry	have	been	shown	to	exhibit	the	representational	richness	of	generative	mechanisms,	yet	are	less	computationally	costly	than	corresponding	discriminative	algorithms	(Chandrashekar	and	Granger	2012);	this	exceptional	pairing	of	high	computational	efficacy	with	low	computational	cost	is	rare.					As	already	discussed,	different	formulations	of	grammars	exhibit	distinct	tiers	of	computational	power;	evidence	thus	far	indicates	that	the	grammars	described	here,	derived	from	cortical-subcortical	circuitry,	are	all	single-stack	algorithms,	which	can	range	from	simple	visibly-pushdown	automata	up	through	higher-order	indexed	pushdown	automata	computing	nested-stack	grammars.		The	different	forms	apparently	depend	on	the	nature	of	cortico-hippocampal	interactions,	as	described	further	below.				
S   → NP VP
NP → DET N｜ADJ N
VP → V ｜ADV V
SNP VP
ADJ N V
his watch stoppedhappy dogs jump
green ideas sleep
Figure 8.  The category S expands to the sequence NP VP; 
these categories in turn expand to disjuncts of either DET N 
or ADJ N; or V or ADV V.  Many combinatorially possible 
constructions can be composited; one such is shown at right, 
along with three sample renderings of the nonterminal items 
(S, NP, VP, N, etc) to terminals (in this instance, English 
words, but these can be arbitrary perceptual or cognitive 
objects (see text).   
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Thesis	B.5)	Cortico-hippocampal	interactions	play	a	specific	role	in	memory	encoding	Extensive	work	indicates	that	the	hippocampus	plays	a	critical	role	in	the	formation	and	retrieval	of	episodic	memory	(Eichenbaum	1998;	Ekstrom	and	Ranganath	2018;	Moscovitch	et	al.	2016;	Wixted	et	al.	2018)	incorporating	information	ranging	across	semantic,	spatial,	and	temporal	(often	“what,”	“where,”	“when”);	the	mechanisms	whereby	such	information	is	stored	and	organized,	however,	remain	very	poorly	understood.			Encephalization	(Jerison	1977)	denotes	the	increase	in	relative	size	of	phylogenetically	later	brain	structures.		Encephalization	derives	almost	entirely	from	differences	in	allometric	exponents:	neocortical	regions,	and	especially	anterior	neocortical	regions,	grow	disproportionately	larger	than	any	other	brain	areas.		As	some	areas	grow	large,	such	as	frontal	cortical	areas,	others	grow	proportionately	smaller,	such	as	most	subcortical	structures	–	very	much	including	the	hippocampus.		In	a	small-brained	mammal	such	as	a	hedgehog,	the	ratio	of	neocortex	to	hippocampus	is	just	less	than	2:1,	i.e.,	the	hippocampus	is	more	than	half	the	size	of	the	entire	neocortex.		In	a	chimp,	the	hippocampus	is	1/100	the	size	of	the	neocortex;	in	a	human,	it	is	1/1000	the	size	of	the	neocortex.				No	cortical	area	operates	in	the	absence	of	tightly	coupled	cortical-subcortical	loops	(Figure	7).		Cortico-hippocampal	loops	are	of	particular	interest	here.		Hippocampal	units	have	been	found	to	produce	remarkable	response	patterns	when	engaged	in	memory-dependent	behavior	such	as	learned	navigation:	neurons	“replay”	and	“preplay”	both	forward	and	backward	activation	sequences	that	previously	occurred	during	successive	moves	while	navigating	through	a	learned	space	(Foster	and	Wilson	2006;	Nádasdy	et	al.	1999;	Davidson,	Kloosterman,	and	Wilson	2009),	and,	notably,	in	many	other	conditions	that	are	not	strictly	navigation-based	(Gupta	et	al.	2010;	Logothetis	et	al.	2012;	Colgin	2016).			
 
Figure 9	 					The	potential	utility	of	the	replay/preplay	mechanism	has	been	often	conjectured	in	the	literature;	notably,	this	pattern	of	responses	are	consistent	with	what	would	be	observed	if	sequential	memory	elements	are	being	“pushed”	onto	and	subsequently	“popped”	off	of	a	stack:	the	elemental	operations	in	the	stack	memories	of	automata	(see	section	C	for	further	stack	discussion).		These	
Figure 9.  Place cell activity experienced during behavior (middle; 10s of seconds) are generated in highly 
compressed form (<100msec) during awake sharp-wave activity before (preplay) and after (replay; reverse 
sequence order) the behavior.  Black traces show sample CA1 local field potentials (LFP).   
 
 (Diba & Buzsaki 07 REF).   
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stack	operations	may	enable	the	tracking	of	ordinal	positions	of	a	given	item	within	a	sequence.		This	could	be	of	adaptive	utility	for	navigating	paths	through	space,	for	memory	“indexing,”	and	for	multiple	other	sequence-dependent	functions	(O'Keefe	and	Nadel	1978;	Eichenbaum	2000;	Hafting	et	al.	2005;	Papp,	Witter,	and	Treves	2007).			The	time	spans	for	neural	activity	are	orders	of	magnitude	different	than	those	for	behavior.		The	former	take	tens	or	hundreds	of	milliseconds;	the	latter	can	extend	across	seconds	or	minutes.		The	unique	long-lasting	activity	of	the	highly	unusual	recurrent	collateral	anatomy	of	hippocampal	field	CA3	may	serve	to	“gear”	these	distinct	time	spans,	enabling	neural	persistence	over	behavior-length	durations	(Cox	et	al.	2019).						The	unique	properties	of	hippocampal	machinery	apparently	are	critical	to	episodic	memory	storage	and	retrieval;	the	hippocampus	is	capable	of	some	operation	that	is	evidently	absent	in	neocortex,	causing	the	hippocampus	to	be	a	bottleneck	in	episodic	memory	processing.		As	brains	grow	larger	and	the	hippocampus	becomes	a	proportionally	far	smaller	component,	that	bottleneck	becomes	more	restrictive.		This	may	indicate	an	important	distinction	between	normal	small-brained	mammals	versus	those	with	extremely	large	brains	and	their	attendant	proportion	changes.		Some	other	instances	of	encephalization	have	the	effect	of	rendering	phylogenetically	older	regions	largely	superfluous:	lesioning	the	superior	colliculus	in	a	rat	severely	impairs	its	visual	abilities,	whereas	corresponding	lesions	in	primates	result	in	highly	subtle	impairments	at	most	(Lawler	and	Cowey	1986).		In	the	case	of	the	hippocampus,	however,	although	some	hippocampal	functions	are	arguably	supplanted	by	cortical	enlargement,	nonetheless	other	functions	evidently	remain	dependent	on	an	intact	hippocampus.				The	two	functions	that	will	be	highlighted	here	(in	the	section	below	sketching	the	dependence	of	episodic	memory	on	hippocampus)	are	timing	and	stack	storage.		These	roles	of	the	hippocampus	enable	the	encoding	of	extended	temporal	information,	likely	because	its	stack-like	operations	(discussed	below)	are	somehow	useful	in	those	encodings.		In	order	to	continue	to	organize	time	sequence	information,	the	hippocampus	cannot	be	eliminated	from	the	critical	path	of	memory	storage	even	when	it	becomes	so	small	that	it	is	a	severe	bottleneck	in	memory	processing.				Overall,	we	conjecture	that	human	cortex	grows	so	large	that	its	cortico-hippocampal	operations	not	only	supplement,	but	largely	supplant,	the	form	of	memory	storage	and	retrieval	that	dominate	in	smaller	brained	mammals.		Cortical	operations	cannot	fully	supersede	hippocampal	operations	due	to	a	continued	dependence	on	unique	operations	–	simple	stack	operations	–	that	are	performed	by	hippocampus;	cortex	is	able	to	perform	the	equivalent	of	nesting	the	resulting	stacks,	but	cannot	produce	the	stacks	themselves	without	cortico-hippocampal	interaction.		This	combination	of	circumstances	(overlarge	cortex,	still-required	hippocampal	operation)	enables	humans	to	generate	comparatively	enormous	cortically	based	memory	capabilities	(which	we	posit	underlies	the	expansion	to	nested-stack	operation),	while	retaining	dependence	on	the	hippocampus.				
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Thesis	B.6)	Seemingly	saltatory	evolutionary	jumps	are	consistent	with	allometry		What	is	the	nature	of	“jumps”	from	pre-human	abilities	to	human	abilities?		The	seemingly	saltatory	leap	between	our	language	abilities	versus	any	preceding	abilities	dichotomizes	research:	either	language	grew	gradually,	with	intermediate	forms,	over	long	time	periods,	or	it	leaped	into	being	“catastrophically”	(Bickerton	1995)	with	the	appearance	of	some	relatively	compact	mutation	that	abruptly	enabled	language	to	emerge	(Hauser	et	al.	2014;	Tattersall	2017;	Boeckx	and	Benitez-Burraco	2014;	Suddendorf	2013).					How	many	before	us	in	the	genus	Homo	had	neocortex-to-hippocampus	ratios	of	substantially	greater	than	95%,	i.e.,	neocortical	sizes	that	almost	entirely	overwhelmed	the	hippocampus?		In	such	thoroughly	encephalized	species,	we	posit	that	cortical	expropriation	of	what	had	been	hippocampal	operations,	generated	the	first	nested	stacks.		Allometrically	estimated	brain	structure	sizes	in	supposed	H.	erectus	and	H.	heidelbergensis	yield	intermediate	neocortex/hippocampus	ratios.		It	is	not	until	these	structures	become	the	default	memory	mechanisms	that	previously	single	unrestricted-stack	automata	(which	generate	context	free	grammars)	became	secondary	to	cortical	nested	stack	systems,	surpassing	context-free	grammars.			The	Homo	fossil	record	contains	either	punctate	jumps	or	exceptionally	fast	“gradual”	bursts	of	growth	(Lynch	and	Granger	2008).		All	in	this	ancestry	are	either	extinct	or	absorbed	into	us;	it	is	unknown	whether	any	in	the	lineage	exhibited	our	supposed	“all-and-only”	traits,	or	precursors	of	them.		Scant	archaeological	evidence	has	been	used	variously	to	strongly	distinguish	prehuman	abilities	from	our	own	(Tattersall	2017)	or	to	identify	possible	continuities	among	them	(McBrearty	and	Brooks	1999).		Some	evidence	suggests	extremely	small	and	localized	early	populations	in	the	Homo	line.		It	is	crucial	not	to	conflate	the	presence	of	intelligent	creatures,	on	one	hand,	with	possible	cultural	effects	of	many	such	creatures,	on	the	other	(McBrearty	and	Brooks	1999)	(Nakahashi	2013).							
C)		Nature	and	application	of	automata	and	formal	grammars		
Thesis	C.1)	The	essential	differences	among	automata	are	their	memory	systems	All	automata	are	simply	FSMs	with	different	types	of	memories.		Turing	machines	included.		So	the	essential	question	devolves	to:	what	type	of	memory	system?					As	mentioned,	the	naming	scheme	for	these	automata	and	grammars	is	far	from	intuitive.		The	sequence	of	automata	begins	with	finite	state	machine,	proceeds	through	restricted-	and	then	unrestricted-stack	machines,	to	nested-stack	machines,	bounded-	and	then	unbounded-stack	machines,	and	then	Turing-complete	machines.		It	of	course	is	non-obvious	from	the	names	alone	that	a	“bounded”	machine	is	more	powerful	than	a	“nested”	machine,	which	in	turn	is	more	
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powerful	than	an	“unrestricted”	single	stack	machine.		The	terminology	arises	from	the	literature	in	formal	automata	theory,	and	does	not	correspond	readily	with	nomenclature	from	other	fields.			
 	
 
Figure 10	
 
 
 
Figure 11		Similarly,	the	names	of	the	formal	grammars	that	correspond	to	these	machines	may	seem	almost	misleading.		Recursively	enumerable	grammars	(computed	by	a	Turing	machine)	are	a	strictly	larger	class	than	so-called	“context-sensitive”	grammars	(computed	by	bounded-stack	automata),	which	in	turn	are	strictly	larger	than	indexed,	combinatory,	and	tree-adjoining	grammars	(computed	by	nested-stack	automata	or	HOPDAs);	these	in	turn	all	are	larger	than	“context-free”	grammars	(computed	by	counterintuitively-named	“unrestricted-stack”	automata);	these	finally	are	larger	than	visibly-pushdown	grammars	(restricted-stack	automata)	and	regular	grammars	(computed	by	simple	finite	state	automata	with	no	stacks).				Colloquially,	we	may	think	that,	since	context	clearly	matters	in	language,	and	language	is	thus	indeed	context-sensitive,	that	this	is	a	feature	that	is	required	in	the	formal	characterization	of	natural	language;	but	the	formal	system	termed	“context	sensitive”	is	just	a	(perhaps	not	ideally	
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Figure 11.  The architecture of automata.  All 
automata contain a finite state machine (FSM; see 
Figure FINITESTATEfig) and some form of stack 
memory.  a) An FSM alone without memory produces 
Regular grammars.  b) Adding a single unrestricted 
stack produces a pushdown automaton (PDA), which 
computes context-free (CF) grammars.  c,d) Adding 
multiple independently-accessible stacks either 
produces either a linear bounded automaton (LBA) if 
the stacks are restricted in length, computing 
context-sensitive (CS) grammars, or a Turing machine 
(TM) if the stacks are unrestricted, computing 
recursively enumerable (RE) grammars.  e) Higher-
order PDAs (HOPDAs) incorporate stacks of stacks 
(nested stacks) to produce larger grammars than 
context free, but less than context sensitive.  These 
are the most powerful form of single stack automata. 
Figure 10.  Finite state machines and 
equivalence classes.  (Top) Initial input stimulus 
a or b arrives (at left) to the input state α.  Next 
input arrives; if it is an “a,” the machine 
transitions to state 𝛽;	if it is not an “a” then no 
state transition occurs (“else”).  Subsequent 
arrival of an “a” transitions the FSM to state γ, 
which is a halting state (double circle).  
Subsequent inputs have no further effect 
(“else”).  (Right) Input sequences “accepted” 
(green) by the FSM, i.e., arriving at a halting 
state, or “rejected” (red; not arriving at a halting 
state).  (Bottom) Another FSM, with different 
states and transitions, accepts and rejects the 
same sequences as the top FSM.  Although 
different, the two are equivalent automata.   
Toward	the	quantification	of	cognition					 		 				R.Granger	2020	
 27 
chosen)	descriptor	for	a	mathematical	entity	with	specific	characteristics	in	the	automata	hierarchy.		As	mentioned,	these	context-sensitive	formal	systems	produce	linguistic	constructs	that	have	been	shown	not	to	occur	in	human	natural	language:	put	another	way,	context-sensitive	grammars	are	too	powerful	to	be	natural	language	machines.		Actual	human	natural	languages	are	less	powerful	than	context-sensitive	formal	grammars.		And	context-sensitive	grammars	are	less	powerful	than	“recursively	enumerable”	grammars,	produced	by	Turing	machines.		(One	of	the	compelling	side	effects	of	the	restriction	on	natural	language	grammars	is	that	there	are	“impossible”	languages,	i.e.,	languages	that	we	can	formally	conceive	of	but	that	do	not	and,	arguably,	cannot	occur	as	an	empirical	human	tongue	(Moro	2008).					Notably,	if	we	begin	with,	say,	a	so-called	“unrestricted	stack”	automaton,	which	recognizes	context-free	grammars,	and	we	add	to	it	a	system	of	nested	stacks,	doing	so	is	equivalent	to	transforming	or	upgrading	the	original	system	from	an	unrestricted-stack	system	to	a	nested-stack	system,	which	is	a	system	of	strictly	greater	computational	power.						Formal	stacks	are	defined	as	last-in	first-out,	i.e.,	the	entity	most	recently	stored	is	the	first	retrieved.		(If	we	store	(or	“push”)	the	sequence	a,b,c	onto	the	stack,	then	we	retrieve	(“pop”)	them	back	off	of	the	stack	in	the	order	c,b,a;	by	contrast,	standard	“queues”	are	first-in	first-out,	i.e.,	retrieval	is	in	the	order	of	storage	(push	a,b,c;	pop	a,b,c).)		Formal	stack	behavior	is	not	intended	to	be	directly	commensurate	with	cortico-hippocampal	operation,	yet	it	is	noteworthy	that	measurement	of	hippocampal	units	are	reported	to	yield	both	forward	and	backward	“replay”	and	“preplay”	constituting	rapid	sequences	of	activations	that	previously	occurred	(and	presumably	were	stored)	during	behaviors,	such	as	successive	locations	arrived	at	in	an	environment.		For	instance,	if	locations	a,b,c	occurred	in	sequence	during	navigation,	then	a,b,c	and	c,b,a	may	be	seen	to	rapidly	occur	during	hippocampal	replay	(Nádasdy	et	al.	1999;	Foster	and	Wilson	2006;	Davidson,	Kloosterman,	and	Wilson	2009;	Gupta	et	al.	2010).		It	has	been	noted	that	these	memory	behaviors	can	be	useful	not	only	in	terms	of	navigation,	but	also	in	terms	of	general	memory	“indexing,”	and	other	potential	sequence-dependent	memory	operations.					As	discussed	earlier,	many	different	formulations	can	carry	out	the	same	computations.		Both	an	electronic	adding	machine	and	a	mechanical	adding	machine	can	add,	even	though	they	may	share	no	common	components	or	operational	steps.		Analyses	aimed	at	identifying	computational	power	(such	as	Turing	equivalence)	must	always	be	viewed	in	terms	of	such	equivalence	classes.		Further	distinctions	require	other	analyses,	beyond	those	of	just	the	automata	hierarchy.					It	is	crucial	to	note	that	any	task	that	is	performable	by	a	Turing	machine,	the	top	of	the	automata	hierarchy,	can	be	perfectly	carried	out	by	an	appropriately	configured	finite	state	machine	(FSM),	the	bottom	of	that	hierarchy.		In	what	possible	sense,	then,	could	these	be	considered	to	be	machines	with	different	computational	powers?		The	answer	is	not	a	minor	detail,	but	rather	is	the	essence	of	the	automata	hierarchy:	any	change	to	the	task	can	still	be	carried	out	by	the	Turing	machine,	whereas	even	slight	changes	may	cause	the	FSM	to	fail.		The	FSM	can	solely	do	tasks	for	which	it	is	rigidly	configured;	it	has	literally	no	memory	beyond	its	current	state.		FSMs	are,	intuitively,	all	hard-coded	information;	all	strictly	innate,	pre-specified	rules.		Those	rules	may	have	substantial	generality	and	power:	a	single	FSM	could	be	built	to	play	chess	or	Go.		What	a	Turing	machine	has,	by	contrast,	is	a	memory	from	which	it	can	store	and	retrieve	information.		It	can	thus	be	reconfigured	on	the	fly,	to	perform	differently	based	on	what	it	has	seen	and	stored.		Thus,	to	tell	apart	an	FSM	from	a	Turing	machine	(or	any	of	the	intermediate	automata	between	these	extremes	in	the	hierarchy),	requires	careful	testing	and	extrapolation,	as	further	discussed	below.					
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Thesis	C.2)	Data	indicate	at	most	context-free	capabilities	for	all	nonhuman	animals		Given	this	formal	hierarchy,	what	can	it	say	about	any	specific	empirical	behaviors?		Researchers	study	corpora	of	data	such	as	recorded	human	spoken	language,	or	bird	calls,	and	attempt	to	identify	a	fit	between	data	and	model.				Crucially,	no	amount	of	experimental	evidence	can	ever	entirely	confirm	a	hypothesis	about	the	fit	between	an	automaton	and	a	body	of	data.		As	mentioned,	any	task	can	be	simulated	perfectly	by	a	finite	state	machine	with	no	stack	memory	whatsoever.		On	one	hand,	that	finite	state	machine	may	be	enormous,	and	on	the	other	hand,	the	very	next	dollop	of	data	may	fail	to	fit	it:	a	classic	instance	of	overfitting,	as	can	occur	with	any	model.		Instead,	studies	attempt	to	narrow	in	on	a	model	from	two	directions:	i)	identifying	classes	of	data	in	the	corpus	that	provide	evidence	that	a	particular	model	is	insufficient,	and	ii)	generating	model	data	to	collect	evidence	that	the	model	is	more	powerful	than	it	needs	to	be	to	account	for	the	corpus.				Thus,	for	instance,	the	utterances	that	would	be	produced	by	a	context-sensitive	grammar	can	be	simulated	by	a	sufficiently	large	context-free	grammar	model.		This	risk	of	overfitting	leads	to	a	necessary	conservatism	in	the	evaluation	of	claims	for	particular	models	(Chomsky	1975).		Examinations	of	utterances	have	routinely	proceeded	in	light	of	this	admonition;	the	resulting	literature	nonetheless	exhibits	a	consistency	of	findings	that	is	persuasive.					Studies	of	corpora	of	nonhuman	communication	(calls	of	primates,	avians,	cetaceans,	etc)	repeatedly	find	them	to	be	context-free	or	simpler.		There	are	analogic	references	to	human	language	in	some	studies	(Abe	and	Watanabe	2011;	Beckers	et	al.	2012),	but	the	analogies	are	difficult	to	substantiate.		Studies	that	carefully	analyze	bird	song,	identify	it	with	finite	state	machines	(FSMs)	(Gentner	and	Hulse	1998;	Berwick	et	al.	2011),	or	even	sub-FSM	systems	(Berwick	and	Pilato	1987;	Beckers	et	al.	2012).		(Sometimes	the	terminology	“compositional	syntax”	is	invoked;	this	nomenclature	is	indeterminate	with	respect	to	the	grammar	hierarchy.		Compositionality	is	exhibited	by	Turing	machines	---	but	also	by	the	regular	grammars	of	simple	finite	state	machines,	and	any	machines	in	between.		The	key	is	to	identify	the	detailed	nature	of	what	is	purportedly	being	composed.)								
Thesis	C.3)	Data	overwhelmingly	indicate	nested	stack	automata	for	human	language	syntax	Extensive	studies	of	human	language	capacity	have	been	carried	out	over	the	course	of	decades,	on	multiple	natural	languages	across	all	continents.		The	investigations	repeatedly	arrive	at	a	fixed	set	of	automata	variants:	tree-adjoining,	head	grammars,	combinatory	categorial	grammars,	and	linear	indexed	grammars	(Pollard	1984;	Joshi	and	Schabes	1997;	Shieber	1985;	Joshi,	Vijay-Shanker,	and	Weir	1991;	Steedman	1987;	Baldridge	2002;	Vijay-Shanker	and	Weir	1994).		This	seemingly	disparate	range	of	findings	are	in	fact	stunningly	circumscribed:	all	are	more	powerful	than	context-free	grammars,	and	less	powerful	than	context-sensitive	grammars.		(Some	have	pointed	out	that	the	majority	of	natural	language	practice	is	context	free,	though	they	acknowledge	that	supra-context-free	usages	demonstrably	exist;	see	(Pullum	and	Gazdar	1982).		These	characterizations	all	inhabit	the	portion	of	the	automata	hierarchy	corresponding	to	“nested	stack”	automata,	producing	the	general	class	of	“indexed”	grammars	(Aho	1968,	1969;	damm	1982).		That	is,	all	of	the	grammars	identified	from	empirical	studies	of	human	natural	languages	arrive	at	special	cases	of	this	distinct	category.				
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These	findings	appear	extraordinarily	unlikely	to	be	simply	coincidental;	they	appear	to	be	compelling	evidence	that	the	mechanisms	underlying	human	language	exhibit	this	specific	narrow	range	of	computational	capacity,	whereas	analyses	of	the	corresponding	mechanisms	underlying	other	animals’	communication	systems	indicate	lesser	computational	power.		(No	in-depth	review	of	these	extensive	technical	findings	is	offered	here;	references	such	as	(Vijay-Shanker	and	Weir	1994;	Joshi,	Vijay-Shanker,	and	Weir	1991)	provide	elaborate	accounts	of	these	findings.)					
Thesis	C.4)	Nested-stack	automata	are	a	“local	ceiling”	in	the	automata	hierarchy	Quite	independent	of	any	empirical	considerations	whatsoever	(such	as	natural	language),	there	are	reasons	to	posit	that	nested	stack	automata	constitute	a	fixed	limit	constraining	the	natural	growth	of	grammars.		Specifically,	nested	stack	automata	are	the	most	powerful	systems	that	can	be	mathematically	achieved	using	strictly	single	(serial)	stacks;	all	more-powerful	automata	(context	sensitive	and	up)	formally	require	simultaneous	parallel	access	to	multiple	independent	stacks.		This	represents	a	highly	persuasive	natural	break	point	in	automata	growth.					Many	standard	depictions	of	the	automata	hierarchy	contain	Type	0	to	Type	3	automata,	which	respectively	produce	regular	grammars	(Type	3),	context	free	grammars	(Type	2),	context	sensitive	grammars	(Type	1),	and	recursively	enumerable	grammars	(Type	0).		Since	the	introduction	of	those	tiers	(Chomsky	1975),	there	have	been	multiple	elaborations	of	the	hierarchy.		Two	such	elaborations	constitute	fundamental	extensions:	i)	the	realm	of	“subregular”	grammars,	specifying	distinctions	among	the	smallest	and	simplest	memory-free	automata	(McNaughton	and	Papert	1971;	Heinz),	and	ii)	the	discovery	and	formal	characterization	of	grammars	that	are	at	a	strict	intermediate	level	between	context-free	and	context-sensitive,	as	detailed	above.		The	subregular	grammars	are	neglected	in	the	current	work,	not	out	of	lack	of	interest,	but	because	they	are	beyond	the	scope	of	the	(already	lengthy)	distinctions	targeted	herein.		The	intermediate	supra-context-free	and	sub-context-sensitive	grammars	are	a	primary	focus	of	the	work	presented	here.			
 
Figure 12		
 
Figure 12.  Expanded view of 
the automata and grammar 
hierarchies (compare Figure 
3, which lacks the distinction 
between single versus 
multiple pushdown stacks).  
The emphasis here is on the 
divide between mechanisms 
containing only single 
pushdown stacks from those 
with multiple independent 
pushdown stacks: it is this 
essential change to the 
mechanisms of automata 
memory that fundamentally 
separates sub-context-
sensitive grammars (CSG) 
from supra-CSG grammars.   
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The	HOPDA	automata	and	their	attendant	nested	grammars	were	initially	identified	by	Aho	(Aho	1968)	and	elaborated	by	many	others	(Hopcroft	and	Ullman	1969;	Maslov	1974;	Joshi,	Levy,	and	Takahashi	1975).		In	brief,	initial	work	illustrated	naturally	occurring	human	language	exceptions	to	context	free	practice,	suggesting	that	context	free	grammars	were	insufficient	to	fully	characterize	language.		The	development	of	further	formalisms	such	as	tree-adjoining,	combinatory,	and	head	grammars,	endeavored	to	specify	mechanisms	that	could	account	for	the	empirical	data	in	human	language.		The	full	characterization	of	nested	stack	automata	become	enriched	over	time,	clarifying	that	these	did	indeed	constitute	a	natural	class	of	automata	that	are	stronger	than	context	free	and	lesser	than	context	sensitive.			
			 	
IV.		Ongoing	issues		
	
a)	Innate	means	the	capability	to	convert	experience	into	particular	abilities		All	humans,	and	only	humans,	acquire	certain	abilities,	such	as	human	counting,	human	language,	human	mental	time	travel,	and	others.					Nonhuman	animals	acquire	lesser	abilities	that	may	be	precursors	to	these	human	abilities	–	but	animals	clearly	do	not	acquire	this	human	constellation	of	abilities.				Conversely,	no	humans	effortlessly	and	ubiquitously	learn	writing,	or	logic,	or	mathematics.		We	may	almost	effortlessly	acquire	the	pre-human	forms	of	these	(such	as	numerosity),	but	we	do	not	become	capable	of	human-level	writing	or	math	unless	we	are	provided	with	extensive	external	resources,	memory	extensions	(chalk,	pencil,	paper,	textbooks),	and	arduous	training.		(This	distinction	perhaps	may	be	reminiscent	of	what	is	needed	for	other	animals	to	learn	even	paltry	subsets	of	human	language).							Something	in	our	brains	is	there	to	enable	this.		Whatever	form	it	takes,	the	twin	questions	are:			i) Why	does	this	system	enable	effortless	language	learning,	but	still	requires	hugely	effortful	learning	of	so	many	other	tasks,	such	as	writing,	logic,	math?			ii) Why	is	this	system	absent	in	all	other	animals;	how	does	it	appear	in	just	us?				The	term	“innate”	can	draw	audible	gasps	from	certain	conference	audiences	(and	reviewers).		There	is	a	need	to	refer	to	precisely	those	capabilities	that	are	unique,	ubiquitous,	and	effortless	to	us;	i.e.,	that	are	acquired	by	all	and	only	humans.		What	is	it	in	us	that	enables	us	to	hear	natural	language	and	acquire	it	(by	whatever	means)	whereas	other	animals	do	not	do	so?					The	term	“innate”	in	this	usage	certainly	does	not	mean	“pre-built-in”;	it	means	that	there	is	something	in	every	human,	before	they	have	any	linguistic	experience,	that	enables	them	to	take	such	experience	when	it	arrives,	and	to	effortlessly	acquire	it	with	its	complex	rules	--	despite	a)	being	unable	to	correspondingly	acquire	other	similarly-complex	systems,	such	as	formal	logic,	without	effort,	and	b)	despite	all	other	animals	being	unable	to	take	those	same	inputs,	under	the	same	circumstances,	and	acquire	the	same	linguistic	system.		Something	is	specifically	different	in	humans.				It	has	been	argued	to	be	everything	from	a	patchwork	quilt	of	built-in	templates	(somehow	evolutionarily	acquired	in	very	recent	evolutionary	history,	while	showing	as	yet	no	explanatory	indicator	of	those	differences	in	any	anatomy,	chemistry,	or	genetics),	to	a	barely-defined	capability	to	construct	hierarchies	(Yang	et	al.	2017),	without	any	careful	characterizations	distinguishing	the	
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linguistic	versions	of	those	hierarchies	from	the	many	other	hierarchies	that	humans	(and	even	other	animals)	copiously	exhibit	(Jackendoff	2011).						
b)	Some	intuitions	about	antecedent,	intrinsically	human,	and	expert	capabilities	Humans	with	external	memory	are	qualitatively	different	from	humans	alone		We	are	far	from	the	first	to	posit	that	human	brains	can	be	formally	treated	as	complex	computational	systems	(Turing	1936).		How	powerful	are	human	brains?		Humans	learn	and	remember,	and	can	be	said	to	read	from	and	write	to	an	intrinsic	memory	store.		Do	they	have	the	computational	power	of	full	Turing	machines,	at	the	top	of	the	automata	hierarchy?				A	human,	of	course,	invented	Turing	machines,	and	we	can	build	Turing-machine-equivalent	computers;	mustn’t	we	therefore	be	at	least	as	powerful	as	the	things	we	build?				Any	questions	about	specific	machines,	of	course,	depend	on	the	formal	definitions	of	those	machines.		In	the	automata	hierarchy,	the	defining	distinctions	among	differing	systems	crucially	arise	from	different	memory	storage	and	retrieval	mechanisms.				In	the	deceptively	simple	card	game	of	“concentration,”	i)	cards	are	placed	face	down	in	a	spatial	array;	ii)	randomly	selected	cards	are	transiently	viewed	to	expose	rank	(e.g.,	Q)	and	color	(red/black);	and	iii)	matching	pairs,	at	any	locations,	are	removed,	with	the	aim	of	eventually	removing	all	cards.		The	features	of	previously-seen	hidden	cards	must	be	remembered	at	their	locations,	and	a	card	that	was	already	removed	is	no	longer	eligible	to	match.				If	arbitrary	unlimited	memory	is	available,	the	game	is	a	trivial	table	lookup.		Yet	humans	are	challenged	by	the	game,	making	errors	both	of	omission	(missing	a	potential	match)	and	commission	(erroneously	committing	to	a	hypothesized	match	that	turns	out	false).		Are	humans	Turing	machines	that	somehow	lack	the	ability	to	adeptly	corral	their	infinite	tape	memories	sufficiently	well	to	remember	several	cards	that	they	have	recently	seen?		It	is	notable	that,	simply	equipped	with	a	paper	and	pencil,	any	human	can	effortlessly	play	the	game	with	no	errors,	eliminating	the	difficulties	imposed	by	memory	limitations.		Could	a	chimp	learn	to	play	the	game	by	utilizing	an	external	memory	of	this	kind?		The	question	is	at	present	untested.				Similarly,	a	typical	schoolchild	can	multiply	two	ten-digit	numbers	with	pencil	and	paper.		Carrying	out	the	same	operation	in	one’s	head	is	beyond	the	capacity	of	most	students.		Or	professors.				Myriad	such	examples	illustrate	the	stark	differences	between	humans	with	only	their	own	intrinsic	abilities,	versus	humans	with	additional,	carefully	trained,	external	mechanisms.		These	simple	illustrative	examples	on	their	own	do	not	make	the	case;	the	case	is	made	by	the	carefully	assembled	arguments	constructed	in	this	paper.					
c)	There	may	be	specialized	circuitry	for	all-and-only	human	abilities	–	and	there	may	not	be.			Hof	and	colleagues	(Sherwood	et	al.	2012)	warn	that	although	“it	is	to	be	expected	that	some	modifications	to	neocortical	organization	will	be	consequences	of	overall	brain-size	expansion	...	other	features,	however,	may	prove	to	have	emerged	independent	of	encephalization.”		They	further	say	that	“to	some	extent,	explaining	human	cognitive	uniqueness	as	merely	a	by-product	of	encephalization,	absolute	brain	size,	or	total	numbers	of	neurons	reflects	the	infancy	of	studies	in	evolutionary	neuroscience.”		A	plethora	of	studies	attempt	to	find	unique	human	characteristics	
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that	are	not	simply	due	to	allometry	or	other	scaling	issues.		As	mentioned	earlier,	seemingly	unique	human	specializations,	such	as	Von	Economo	or	rosehip	neurons,	or	ASPM	or	FOXP2	alleles,	have	repeatedly	been	found	to	occur	in	nonhumans	–	and	even	if	they	were	uniquely	human,	they	would	be	but	a	small	step	on	the	way	to	actual	explanatory	accounts	of	how	their	presence	somehow	generates	entirely	new	mechanisms	to	give	all-and-only	abilities	to	humans.						The	search	for	punctate	biological	differences	may	eventually	succeed.		But	it	may	turn	out	that	the	differences	are	distributed	and	cumulative	–	far	from	punctate.		And	it	may	even	turn	out,	as	Hof	and	many	others	have	noted,	that	there	is	something	that	arises	during	brain-size	expansion	that	is	not	just	random	quantitative	increase,	but	differential	increases	in	highly	specific	circuitries,	that	generates	fundamental	changes	in	the	modes	of	operation	of	the	brain,	mechanistically	conferring	new	mental	capacities.				It	is	unknown	whether	this	is	the	moment	that	we	should	be	looking	to	such	devices	as	explanatory	mechanisms.		Perhaps	the	search	for	punctate	differences,	though	exhausting,	is	not	exhausted.		A	remarkable	number	of	constraints	have	been	identified,	and	a	trove	of	previously-forwarded	hypotheses	have	been	all	but	ruled	out,	but	in	some	ways,	these	are	indeed	still	early	days	for	brain	evolution.				We	do	not	turn	to	scaling	issues	out	of	any	despair	at	the	ongoing	and	necessary	search	for	new	brain	characteristics.		Rather,	we	affirmatively	posit	that	human	unique	and	ubiquitous	abilities,	very	much	including	language,	arise	as	a	(huge	and	crucial)	qualitative	difference	originating	from	a	(colossal)	quantitative	change.		As	we	have	seen,	when	these	abilities	are	quantified,	as	in	human	language,	they	cry	out	specifically	for	the	scaling	of	memory	mechanisms	as	their	fundamental	explanation.							Where	there	are	human	and	prehuman	versions	of	an	ability,	the	relations	between	these	versions	will	continue	to	be	of	interest.		Whatever	the	terminology,	it	is	crucial	to	make	appropriate	distinctions.		To	aggregate	effortless	and	effortful	capabilities	all	together	is	simply	to	fail	to	recognize	a	distinction.		If	the	argument	is	that	the	differences	are	minor,	that	case	can	only	be	made	once	the	distinctions	are	clearly	articulated.		We	here	emphasize	that	there	are	profound	distinctions:	between	human	capacities	that	come	extraordinarily	naturally	for	us	and	for	no	others	(such	as	natural	language	and	counting);	abilities	that	come	naturally	both	to	us	and	to	other	animals	(e.g.,	numerosity);	and	abilities	that	do	not	come	naturally	even	for	the	vast	majority	of	humans	(writing,	formal	logic).		Our	aim	is	to	distinguish	among	these	clearly-separable	capacities,	and	to	attempt	to	characterize	their	differences.					The	conclusions	established	here	arise	in	large	part	from	the	well	documented,	but	nonetheless	extremely	surprising,	evolutionary	adherence	to	allometry:	the	constituent	components	of	a	mammalian	brain	are	strikingly	and	accurately	predictable	via	straightforward	allometric	equations,	as	opposed	to	any	evidence	of	any	evolutionary	pressures.		There	is	no	evidence	of	substantial	contributions	needed	from	natural	selection	(Finlay	and	Darlington	1995;	Herculano-Houzel	2009,	2012;	Charvet,	Striedter,	and	Finlay	2011).						Hauser	et	al.	(Hauser	et	al.	2014)	argue	that	size	alone	is	not	sufficient	for	human	language,	citing	two	key	facts:		- autistics	with	larger	brains	often	nonetheless	have	language	deficits;		- children	with	one	hemisphere	removed	prior	to	full	acquisition	of	language	often	display	normal	language	expression	and	comprehension.		
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The	former	point	simply	shows	that	size	is	not	sufficient,	though	it	may	be	necessary;	the	latter	purports	to	argue	that	size	is	not	necessary.		Autistics	may	simply	have	additional	mechanisms	in	place	that	actively	interfere	with	otherwise-intact	language	systems;	these	and	other	pathologies	are	miswirings,	which	of	course	can	prevent	language	(and	other	human	abilities)	over	and	above	the	proper	sizes.		And	children	who	have	undergone	certain	surgical	procedures	are	nonetheless	encephalized	to	a	greater	extent	than	any	other	primate,	and	still	exhibit	an	enormous	cortical-subcortical	ratio.		That	is	our	predictor	of	sufficient	circuitry.		Not	“size	alone.”		Language	(and	possibly	other	all-and-only	human	abilities)	are	“presumably	the	product	of	a	complex	and	specific	internal	wiring,	and	not	simply	some	slowly-evolved	gross	byproduct	of	increasing	encephalization.”		It	is	unclear	why	the	meticulous	specificity	of	allometric	encephalization	may	be	dismissed	as	“gross,”	as	though	to	make	it	appear	that	it	is	insufficiently	exacting	to	accomplish	the	change	from	one	kind	of	automaton	to	another.		Specific	brain	circuitry,	with	distinct	circuits	occurring	in	particular	ratios,	“gross”	or	not,	may	constitute	the	necessary	conditions	for	the	emergence	of	human	language.					Mammalian	thalamocortical	loops	compute	grammars,	but	in	small	brains,	these	have	correspondingly	small,	hippocampally-limited	memory	storage	stack	mechanisms,	limiting	them	to	sub-context-free	grammars.		All	mammalian	brains,	including	humans,	are	dependent	on	hippocampal	stacks	in	cortico-hippocampal	loops,	but	the	huge	cortical-subcortical	ratio	in	humans	enables	supplementation	of	hippocampal	stacks	via	cortical	storage.		This	changes	the	nature	of	our	working	memory	capacity	(Brady,	Störmer,	and	Alvarez	2016),	enabling	encephalized	cortical	performance	of	otherwise	hippocampus-only	memory	storage.		We	have	here	hypothesized	that	the	result	is	the	hierarchical	cortical	ability	to	nest	stacks,	which	the	hippocampal	memory	system	cannot	do.		Nested-stack	augmentation	of	the	smaller-brained	context-free	ability	enables	the	computational	power	of	nested	stack	automata,	which	in	various	analyses	have	corresponded	to	“mildly	context-sensitive,”	“tree-adjoining,”	and	“categorial	combinatory”	grammars:	all	stronger	than	context	free	and	weaker	than	context	sensitive.					It	is	this	specific	circuitry,	in	these	altered	proportions	–	not	just	indiscriminate	increased	size	of	any	old	unspecified	circuits	–	that	rises	to	the	level	of	nested	stack	automata.		It	is	this	change	that	confers	human	language	abilities	as	well	as	other	all-and-only	human	abilities	–	those	capacities	possessed	by	all	humans,	and	only	humans.					
d)	Cortico-hippocampal	loops	compute	the	equivalent	of	nested	stacks,	critical	for	episodic	memory	In	a	recent	experiment	(Wixted	et	al.	2018)	individuals	took	a	20-30	minute	walk	across	an	unfamiliar	university	campus	during	which	several	events	occurred.		Recall	of	the	individual	objects	that	were	seen,	their	locations,	and	the	order	in	which	they	occurred	was	assessed	directly	afterwards.		Subjects	with	hippocampal	damage	were	still	somewhat	able	to	report	what	they	saw,	and	where	they	saw	it,	but	they	had	no	ability	to	describe	the	sequence	in	which	they	encountered	these	objects	along	their	walking	path.				This	ability	to	encode	time	and	sequence	information	(I	saw	the	building	before	I	saw	the	large	tree;	and	after	those,	I	saw	the	truck)	apparently	must	rely	on	mechanisms	within	the	specialized	circuitry	of	the	several	hippocampal	fields,	that	evidently	are	absent	from	neocortex.		Intact	cortico-hippocampal	interactions	are,	for	some	reason,	required	to	deal	with	episodic	information.				In	light	of	the	extreme	hippocampal	bottleneck	in	humans,	the	findings	of	Alvarez	et	al.	(Brady,	Störmer,	and	Alvarez	2016)	may	lead	to	further	predictions	with	respect	to	time-varying	data.		They	found	that	working	memory	capacity	was	dependent	on	stored	real-world	knowledge	of	the	
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objects	to	be	held	in	memory,	possibly	suggesting	cortical	(real-world	memory)	schemas	created	on	the	fly	that	accumulate	and	hold	information	over	longer	time	periods	than	would	be	possible	using	solely	hippocampal-dependent	mechanisms.		We	suggest	that	such	findings	will	not	hold	for	moving	stimuli,	e.g.,	movies	of	objects	occurring	in	spatial	locations	in	a	virtual	environment:	organization	of	these	stimuli	ought	to	continue	to	be	dependent	on	the	bottleneck	of	hippocampal	mechanisms,	so	tests	of	sequential	order	retained	in	working	memory	should	show	a	lower	capacity	than	experiments,	like	those	in	Alvarez	et	al.,	that	do	not	test	for	retained	sequential	order	information.				We	have	emphasized	that	all	automata	differences	arise	solely	from	differences	in	the	precise	form	of	their	memory	systems.		Even	Turing	machines,	at	the	top	of	the	automata	hierarchy,	are	just	FSMs	(bottom	of	the	hierarchy),	plus	particular	forms	of	memory	manipulation.		Importantly,	as	mentioned,	vast	numbers	of	different	physical	systems	can	equate	to	the	same	class	of	automaton;	the	abstract	mechanisms	(FSM+memory)	capture	not	the	apparatus	but	the	equivalence	class	(as	in	the	simple	example	of	Figure	10).				We	may	articulate	the	“cortical	subcortical	nested	stack	supplementation”	(CSNS)	hypothesis:		
Human	cortices	grow	so	disproportionately	large	that	they	supplement	hippocampal	
stack	memories	with	cortical	memory	structures,	producing	nested-stack	grammars.				The	hippocampi	are	still	a	gateway,	perhaps	because	they	have	unique	mechanisms	for	gearing	time	durations	between	brief	(millisecond)	neurophysiological	time	and	extended	(seconds	or	longer)	behavioral	time.		They	are	still	on	the	critical	path,	but	now	constitute	an	ineluctable	hippocampal	bottleneck.					
e)	On	“scala	naturae”	fallacies	If	ants	or	bees	can	perform	advanced	navigation,	then	they	might	seem	already	to	be	high	in	the	grammar	hierarchy	–	and	in	general,	some	specific	behavioral	accomplishment	may	seem	to	be	associated	with	some	particular	automaton.		This	surrogate	“scala	naturae”	can	be	seductively	misleading.		The	fallacy	is	that	any	given	complex	grammar	can	be	simulated	perfectly	by	a	weaker	grammar,	even	by	a	(sufficiently	large)	finite	state	machine	alone	–	up	to	some	fixed	embedding	depth.				Put	simply,	all	of	the	states	that	would	arise	from	memory	retrieval	in	a	higher-level	automaton	can	simply	be	pre-created	and	made	into	explicit	extra	states	in	a	state	machine,	with	or	without	memory.		Thus,	for	any	single	set	of	tasks	given	in	advance,	a	finite	state	machine	can	be	fashioned	to	perform	the	tasks,	no	matter	how	computationally	demanding.		Any	task	that,	in	full,	would	require	a	Turing	machine,	can	be	simulated	in	part,	up	to	some	pre-established	precision.		The	moment	a	new	task	is	introduced,	outside	the	set	of	previous	fixed	tasks,	then	the	Turing	machine	can	nonetheless	perform	it	whereas	the	FSM	will	fail.				It	is	far	from	trivial	to	discover	whether	some	given	operation	(e.g.,	a	critical	syntactic	operation)	may	require	the	full	power	of	a	particular	automaton,	or	only	require	a	proper	subset	of	such	machines.		Ants	may	well	be	navigating	via	large	FSMs,	exhibiting	prowess	on	tasks	that	are	“built	in,”	and	abruptly	failing	in	tasks	that	would	otherwise	seem	to	be	equivalently	demanding.				As	has	long	been	noted	(Chomsky	1975),	experimental	evidence	may	at	best	weaken	a	hypothesis,	but	is	insufficient	to	fully	verify	(let	alone	discover)	the	existence	of	particular	computational	power.		This	uncertainty	of	identifying	the	exact	power	required	for	a	task,	and	the	corresponding	potential	pitfall	of	an	imagined	“scala	naturae,”	warn	of	possible	spurious	interpretations.		These	
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are	of	course	nonetheless	not	to	be	taken	as	arguments	against	the	simple	reality	of	the	extensively	studied	automata	hierarchy,	nor	arguments	against	powers	gained	through	evolutionary	advance.				
f)	Equivalence	classes	are	not	simply	conflating	abstract	formalisms	directly	with	brain	mechanisms	The	levels	of	implementation,	algorithm,	and	computation	are	of	course	separable.		Mathematical	formalisms	of	stacks	might	have	turned	out	to	be	equivalently	implemented	via	entirely	different	mechanisms	looking	nothing	like	mathematical	stacks.		It	is	somewhat	surprising	that	in	this	case,	based	on	the	hippocampal	preplay/replay	literature,	the	biological	version	and	mathematical	version	may	turn	out	to	closely	correspond.		Certainly	nothing	rules	this	out,	and	the	evidence	arises	from	biological	studies	of	the	hippocampus,	not	from	stacks	being	retrofitted	or	arbitrarily	assigned	to	the	hippocampus.		(See	also	(Gallistel	and	King	2011)	for	further	discussion	of	the	relationships	between	formal	mechanisms	and	potential	neural	implementations).					The	allometric	evidence	presented	here	is	an	instance	of	sheer	bottom-up	analytic	treatment	of	detailed	cortical-subcortical	circuitry,	which	quite	unexpectedly	led	to	identification	of	grammars	and	grammar	growth	–	not	at	all	the	other	way	around.				The	work	did	not	start	with	hierarchies,	nor	with	stacks,	nor	with	language	at	all.		These	findings	are	in	no	way	artificially	superimposing	abstractions	onto	neuroscience;	they	arise	from	bottom-up	simulation	and	analytic	studies	of	telencephalic	circuitry,	that	turn	out	to	strongly	implicate	formal	grammars	as	emergent	circuit	mechanisms.		Those	formal	grammars	were	in	no	way	related	to	language,	but	rather	to	elemental	brain	operations,	and	it	was	quite	unforeseen,	and	unlooked-for,	that	the	findings	then	turned	out	to	be	concordant	with	linguistic	phenomena	(in	addition	to	a	range	of	nonlinguistic	neurobiological,	behavioral,	and	evolutionary	data).					
g)	A	vast	set	of	candidate	anatomies	for	human	language	are	consistent	with	pure	allometric	growth	Several	researchers	(see,	e.g.,	(Berwick	and	Chomsky	2016;	Friederici	et	al.	2017))	have	pointed	out	that	growth	of	arcuate	fasciculus	and	superior	longitudinal	fasciculus	connects	BA44	and	45,	temporal	cortical	regions,	and	supramarginal	cortex,	completing	an	anatomical	loop	that	is	unique	to	humans.		This	could	have	been	argued	to	be	an	adaptation.		But	the	size	of	the	arcuate	fasciculus,	like	other	structures	and	pathways,	are	directly	allometrically	determinable	from	overall	brain	size.		Specifically,	the	human	arcuate	fasciculus	is	consistent	with	the	size	expected	for	a	primate	with	a	brain	of	human	size.		The	connectivity	of	these	axon	tracts	thus	only	arises	in	brains	of	a	given	size.		This	is	an	additional	example	of	specific	circuitry	in	combination	with	sufficient	allometric	growth.		(Moreover,	the	arcuate	fasciculus	alone	is	far	from	the	only	anatomical	story	in	language	capacity;	see,	e.g.,	(Hagoort	2019)	for	recent	review).				Beyond	these	questions	of	comparative	anatomy	are,	of	course,	questions	of	mechanism.		Computational	analyses	show	how	allometric	growth	can	yield	ostensibly	saltatory	changes,	as	increased	stack	mechanisms	(already	in	place,	but	now	allometrically	enlarged)	incrementally	advance	through	the	grammar	hierarchy	(Rodriguez	and	Granger	2016).		By	contrast,	if	a	theory	requires	that	a	novel	computation,	not	previously	present	in	the	brain,	now	arises	in	some	specific	brain	area(s)	(BA44,	or	others	in	the	arcuate	loop),	such	theory	requires	far	more	compelling	evidence	and	mechanistic	analyses	before	it	moves	from	being	a	statistical	observation	to	being	a	potential	explanatory	hypothesis.					
h)	Neither	simply	gradualist	nor	simply	catastrophist	Tattersall	(Tattersall	2017)	dichotomizes	the	possible	rise	of	human	language:	either	it	“came	into	existence	gradually,	over	a	vast	period	of	time,	as	natural	selection	steadily	exerted	its	pressure	on	
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the	populations	that	possessed	it	and	its	antecedents”	or	“true	language,	via	the	emergence	of	syntax,	was	a	catastrophic	event,	occurring	within	the	first	few	generations	of	Homo	sapiens”	(Bickerton	1995),	because	“a	relatively	simple	algorithmic	basis	of	language”	made	a	“language-ready	brain”	(Boeckx	and	Benitez-Burraco	2014)	in	which	human-level	language	“can	emerge	virtually	instantaneously.”				We	first	dispose	of	the	pure	gradualist	position.		Pinker	and	Bloom	(Pinker	and	Bloom	1990)	wrote	that	“Every	detail	of	grammatical	competence	that	we	wish	to	ascribe	to	selection	must	have	conferred	a	reproductive	advantage	on	its	speakers,	and	this	advantage	must	be	large	enough	to	have	become	fixed	in	the	ancestral	population.		And	there	must	be	enough	time	and	genomic	space	separating	our	species	from	nonlinguistic	primate	ancestors.”		Perhaps	they	misspoke;	it	is	extraordinarily	well	documented	that	a	mutation	may	well	become	fixed	in	a	population	merely	by	not	being	selected	against;	far	from	being	such	a	large	advantage.		It	also	is	well	documented	(as	they	mention)	that	a	mutation	without	advantage	may	be	yoked	to	another	advantageous	(but	possibly	unrelated)	change	(as	in	exaptations,	or	“spandrels”).			In	the	present	instance,	brain	size	increase	was	far	from	gradual:	the	fossil	record	most	typically	contains	either	incredibly	fast	bursts	of	growth,	or	punctate	jumps	(both	supporting	and	contrasting	evidence	has	been	forwarded;	e.g.,	(Eldredge	and	Gould	1972;	Gould	2002;	Dawkins	1996).		The	origin	of	these	exceptional	increases	remains	controversial,	but	the	timeline	itself	is	well	documented.				Tattersall	tells	us	that	since	“brain	size	increase	was	a	property	of	the	Homo	clade	in	general,”	it	“evidently	had	nothing	to	do	with	how	modern	Homo	sapiens,	specifically,	did	or	does	its	cognitive	business.”		He	arrives	at	this	conclusion	from	a	consideration	of	the	existing	archeological	record:	contrasts	between	presumed	Homo	sapiens	and	Neanderthal	sites,	on	one	hand;	and	between	pre-	and	post-Middle	Stone	Age	eras	on	the	other,	when	evidence	of	complex	cognition	appears	in	the	forms	of	long-distance	transportation,	hide	preservation,	pierced	and	ochre-stained	shells,	and	related	events.		It	is	notable	that	the	estimates	of	these	“earliest”	complex	behavioral	phenomena	have	repeatedly	been	pushed	back,	with	almost	every	new	archaeological	finding;	one	might	be	forgiven	for	somewhat	discounting	the	current	versions	of	those	estimates	and	instead	actually	extrapolating	from	the	timeline	of	further	discoveries	and	their	remarkable	tendency	to	cause	backward	revisions	of	the	estimates.		Some	evidence	suggests	extremely	small	and	localized	early	populations	of	Homo	sapiens	(or	their	similar	antecedents:	it	is	notable	that	no	sequencing	yet	exists	of,	e.g.,	Cro-magnon	and	other	Upper	Paleolithic	purported	modern	humans),	perhaps	entailing	a	combination	of	changes	in	individuals	and	in	societies.				All	relevant	ancestors	are	gone,	and	we	do	not	know	whether	they	had	language.		We	specifically	propose	that	brains	with	neocortex-to-hippocampus	ratio	up	to	values	of	0.9	may	be	characterized	as	equivalent	to	single	unrestricted-stack	automata,	generating	context	free	grammars;	when	the	cortex-to-hippocampus	ratio	exceeds	the	value	of	0.9,	the	cortical	encephalization	of	what	had	previously	been	a	purely	hippocampal	mechanism,	generates	the	first	nested	stacks.		If	there	had	been	brain	sizes	intermediate	to	those	of	apes,	on	one	hand,	and	Homo	sapiens	on	the	other,	they	might,	according	to	this	reasoning,	have	been	constructing	nested	grammars	(see	Table	1).				
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			 			The	findings	presented	herein	appear	to	provide	a	candidate	explanatory	account	of	allometric	evolution	of	human	all-and-only	capacities,	including	natural	language:	the	apparent	abrupt	(qualitative)	changes	to	behavioral	and	cognitive	capabilities	arise	as	a	particular	brain	circuitry	achieves	specific	quantitative	thresholds	of	stacks	in	single-stack	pushdown	automata,	as	a	direct	consequence	of	allometrically	growing	cortical-subcortical	ratios,	independent	of	any	effects	of	natural	selection	or	other	extrinsic	influences.				This	may	have	happened	extraordinarily	suddenly,	by	virtue	of	the	allometric,	yet	enormous,	change	to	cortical-hippocampal	ratios,	with	little	or	no	need	for	adaptation,	as	with	all	allometric	steps.				The	category	of	human	all-and-only	abilities	are	fundamental	to	humanness;	in	a	crucial	way,	they	quantitatively	define	what	we	intrinsically	are.					Human	minds	are,	by	that	evidence,	nested-stack	automata,	intrinsically	computing	indexed	grammars.		Our	natural	languages	clearly	reflect	this;	further	quantitative	analyses	of	other	abilities	may	demonstrate	that	this	is	also	true	of	any	capacity	that	is	in	all,	and	only,	humans.						
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